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Introduction
The states have largely prevailed in their struggle against the
federal government for control over marijuana policy. More than
twenty states have already legalized marijuana for some purposes under
state law, and the number is sure to grow.1 Though the federal
government has not yet formally repealed its own marijuana
prohibition,2 it has largely ceded control of the issue to the states.3
†

Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Law and Government,
Vanderbilt University Law School (robert.mikos@vanderbilt.edu). I thank
Jonathan Adler, Jonathan Caulkins, Paul Edelman, Sam Kamin, Beau
Kilmer, Pat Oglesby, Rosalie Pacula, Christopher Serkin, and participants at the Marijuana, Federal Power, and the States Symposium at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law and the Drug Law and
Policy Roundtable at Vanderbilt University Law School, for helpful
comments. I also thank Andrea Alexander and Alex Nourafshan for diligent research assistance.

1.

State Medical Marijuana Laws, NCSL (Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter NCSL
Marijuana], http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuanalaws.aspx.

2.

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a) (2012).

3.

See Staff of H. Rules Committee, 113th Cong., Text of House
Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 213–14 (2014)
(instructing that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act to the
Department of Justice may be used . . . to prevent . . . States from
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution,
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana”); Dep’t of the
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But the states are now facing growing opposition from within their
own borders. Citing concerns over marijuana’s perceived harms, many
local communities in marijuana legalization states are seeking to
reinstate marijuana prohibitions at the local level.4 Communities in at
least twelve marijuana legalization states have already passed local
bans on marijuana dispensaries.5 Even in Colorado, arguably the state
with the most liberal marijuana policies, more than 150 municipalities
have passed ordinances banning the commercial sale of marijuana.6 And
countless other communities that otherwise welcome or at least tolerate
the marijuana industry are nonetheless attempting to regulate it,
imposing their own idiosyncratic rules concerning the location, size,
hours, signage, security, and goods sold and taxes paid by local
vendors.7

Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Fin-2014-G001,
BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses
(2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/
FIN-2014-G001.pdf (signaling that FinCEN will allow banks to provide
financial services to some marijuana dealers, notwithstanding the
stringent federal ban on the drug); Memorandum from James M. Cole,
Att’y General, to U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/reso
urces/3052013829132756857467.pdf (signaling that the DOJ will not
prosecute marijuana dealers who comply with state law and do not
implicate other federal enforcement priorities).
4.

See e.g., Eric M. Johnson, Local Bans Try to Put Lid on Washington
State Pot Shop Investors, REUTERS (May 13, 2014), http://www.reuters
.com/article/2014/05/13/usa-marijuana-washington-idUSL2N0NS04W20
140513 (reporting that “nearly 50 municipalities [in Washington] have
enacted bans, moratoria and restrictive zoning ordinances, largely citing
fears of a federal crackdown, their children getting high, and costly
enforcement”); Jacob Sullum, Will Local Bans Undermine Marijuana
Legalization in Washington?, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/01/24/will-local-bans-underminemarijuana-legalization-in-washington/ (reporting that several cities in
Washington “have banned marijuana businesses, while more than 20
others have imposed moratoriums”).

5.

The states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how the states have
responded to local bans.

6.

Jon Murray & John Aguilar, Colorado Cities and Towns Take Diverging
Paths on Recreational Marijuana, The Denver Post (Dec. 27, 2014);
COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, Summary of Local Retail
Marijuana Actions: Thru Fall 2014, http://www.cml.org/Issues/El
ections/Election-Results/Election-Results-Retail-Marijuana/.

7.

For very helpful surveys of the regulations now being imposed by local
governments, see Jeremy Nemeth & Eric Ross, Planning for Marijuana:
The Cananbis Conundrum, J. Am. Plan. Assoc. 6 (Aug. 2014) and
Patricia E. Salkin & Zachary Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets Zoning:
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These local ordinances raise one of the most important and unresolved questions surrounding marijuana law reforms: What power, if
any, should states give local governments to regulate marijuana? How
the states choose to answer this question will not only influence the
content and pace of reforms, but could also have a dramatic impact on
the overall level of popular satisfaction with marijuana policy.
Proponents of localism suggest that local communities can do a better
job of tailoring marijuana policies to suit the preferences of local
majorities8—the same argument that states have employed to wrest
control from the national government.9 In other words, locals are simply
saying that what’s good for the goose is good for the gosling.
But there is one important difference between localism and federalism: States have far greater influence over localities than the federal
government has over the states. The states have a degree of
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy from federal interference. This is
why they have been able to legalize marijuana, notwithstanding the
federal government’s strict ban on the drug10 and claims that state
legalization has imposed negative externalities on neighboring states.11
In other words, the federal government could not stop the states from

Can You Grow, Sell, and Smoke That Here?, 62 Planning & Envir. L.
3 (Aug. 2010).
8.

E.g., City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness
Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 494, 508 (Cal. 2013) (suggesting that “while some
counties and cities might consider themselves well suited to accommodating medical marijuana dispensaries, conditions in other communities
might lead to the reasonable decision that such facilities within their
borders, even if carefully sited, well managed, and closely monitored,
would present unacceptable local risks and burdens”).

9.

See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1305
(1994) [hereinafter Briffault, Normative and Formal Concerns] (“[T]he
values said to be advanced by federalism are not distinctively associated
with the states. Many of these values—increasing opportunities for
political participation, keeping government close to the people, intergovernmental competition, the representation of diverse interests—may
be served better by local governments than by states.”). See also Heather
K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev.
4 (2010) (urging scholars to consider the potential benefits of devolving
authority onto a multitude of government actors, including localities).

10.

See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand.
L. Rev. 1419 (2009) [hereinafter Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy] for
an in-depth explanation of how the states won the war for control over
marijuana policy.

11.

See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion regarding claims that Coloradosourced marijuana is flooding neighboring states.
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legalizing marijuana even if it sorely wanted to.12 In contrast, local
governments have no similar constitutional protection against state
interference, at least as a matter of federal constitutional law. This
means states could conceivably prevent local governments from
meddling with state marijuana policy, if they deemed local control
normatively undesirable.13 The only real question then is what should
the states do?
Despite the importance and very live nature of the local authority
question, there has been surprisingly little attention paid to it. Most
marijuana legalization states have simply failed to address local
authority when crafting their marijuana laws, including recent
reforms.14 This means the issue is being resolved through costly and
lengthy litigation.15 Indeed, in many states, the issue of local control
remains unsettled.16 And while many scholars have weighed in on the
federalism issues surrounding marijuana law reforms (including yours
12.

See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1423–24
(“States may continue to legalize marijuana because Congress has not
preempted—and more importantly, may not preempt—state laws that
merely permit (i.e., refuse to punish) private conduct the federal
government deems objectionable.”).

13.

See infra Part IV.A.

14.

See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how states have addressed the
marijuana localism question.

15.

There have been dozens of lawsuits filed challenging local bans on
marijuana, and state courts have reached starkly different conclusions
regarding the propriety of those bans. Compare City of Riverside v. Inland
Empire Patients Health and Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 494 (Cal. 2013)
(upholding a local ban on retail medical marijuana shops, notwithstanding
California’s Compassionate Use Act) with Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming,
846 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 2014) (striking a local ban on marijuana
cultivation as preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act).

16.

For example, the attorney general of Washington recently issued an
opinion declaring that state Initiative-502, which legalized recreational
marijuana in 2012, does not preempt local bans on marijuana shops. See
Letter from Robert W. Ferguson, Att’y General of Washington, to the
Hon. Sharon Foster, Chair, Washington State Liquor Control Board,
Whether Statewide Initiative Establishing System for Licensing
Marijuana Producers, Processors, and Retailers Preempts Local Ordinances 2 (Jan. 16, 2014), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/
uploadedFiles/FosterAGO2014No02.pdf
(concluding
that
“[l]ocal
governments have broad authority to regulate within their jurisdictions,
and nothing in [the state initiative] limits that authority with respect to
licensed marijuana businesses”). But state license applicants have sued to
block local bans, and it is unclear whether the courts will agree with the
state attorney general’s conclusion. See State Attorney General Seeks to
Join Marijuana Lawsuits in Fife, Wenatchee to Defend I-502, Kent
Reporter (July 31, 2014), http://www.kentreporter.com/news/269420
451.html (noting the Washington attorney general’s intervention in three
lawsuits challenging city ordinances that ban marijuana shops).

722

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Marijuana Localism

truly),17 they have all but ignored the important power battles now
flaring up within the states.18
This Article begins to fill the gap. It aims to provide lawmakers,
jurists, scholars, and other interested parties insights into the
desirability of enabling local communities to regulate the sale of
marijuana. I focus on local power over marijuana sales because it is the
most salient localism battleground today. Notably, no state has yet
allowed a local government to ban the simple possession of the drug
where state law permits such possession.19 Even local bans on personal
cultivation of the drug appear suspect under state law.20 Nonetheless,

17.

See generally, e.g., William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary
and Proper Clause, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 513 (2015); Erwin
Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation,
62 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 74 (2015); Brannon P. Denning, One Toke Over the
(State) Line: Constitutional Limits on “Pot Tourism” Restrictions, 66
Fla. L. Rev. 2279 (2014); Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and
Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2015); Sam Kamin & Eli
Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 Or. L. Rev. 869
(2013); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the
War on Drugs, 15 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 507 (2006); Ernest A.
Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist
Revival After Gonzales v Raich, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. For my own work
analyzing federalism issues surrounding marijuana law reforms, see
Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J.
Health Care L. & Pol’y 5 (2013) [hereinafter Mikos, Preemption
Under the Controlled Substances Act]; Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of
Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans,
Cato
Pol’y
Analysis, Dec. 2012, at 1, available
at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA714.pdf; Robert
A. Mikos, Can States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government? 161
U. Pa. L. Rev. 103 (2012); Robert A. Mikos, Medical Marijuana and the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 997 (2012);
Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 633 (2011);
Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other
Federal Crimes, 2010 U. Chi. Legal. F. 223 (2010) [hereinafter Mikos,
State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution]; Mikos, On the Limits of
Supremacy, supra note 10.

18.

There are at least two notable exceptions. See Nemeth & Ross, Planning
for Marijuana, supra note 7; Salkin & Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets
Zoning, supra note 7.

19.

For example, Amendment 64 expressly declares that it “shall not be an
offense under Colorado law or the law of any locality within Colorado” for
anyone twenty-one years of age or older to possess one ounce or less of
marijuana. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(a) (emphasis added).

20.

Id. § 16(3)(b) (stating that there will be no penalty under the law of any
locality for “[p]ossessing, growing, processing, or transporting no more
than six marijuana plants, with three or fewer being mature, flowering
plants, and possession of the marijuana produced by the plants on the
premises where the plants were grown, provided that the growing takes
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this Article could be used to gauge the desirability of local power over
these and other issues as well, should the need arise.
The Article approaches its task in three steps. First, it discusses
the economic theory of localism, focusing on the primary economic
rationale behind localism decisions: the desire to maximize satisfaction
with government policy. Under this theory, localism’s net impact on
preference satisfaction hinges on the relative strength of two competing
considerations: (1) the degree to which local communities disagree
about how to regulate a given activity; and (2) the degree to which
local communities absorb the full costs and benefits of the regulated
activity—or, to put it another way, the degree to which people are
likely to care about how the activity is being regulated elsewhere.
Second, the Article attempts to gauge the strength of these
competing considerations when it comes to regulating marijuana sales.
The Article suggests that local communities do indeed disagree about
how to regulate marijuana sales, as evidenced by the divergent policies
they are now pursuing and the local votes in recent elections. At the
same time, however, the Article suggests that local communities do not
absorb the full costs and benefits of local marijuana sales. The reason
is that residents of one community can easily purchase marijuana in
other communities and consume it there or back home. Easy access to
marijuana in neighboring communities threatens to undermine the
efficacy of many local marijuana regulations and thus the ability of
local governments to satisfy the policy preferences of large
constituencies.
Third, the Article develops a case study of local alcohol control and
mines this case study for lessons about local marijuana control. It is, of
course, far too early to gauge the impact of local marijuana regulations.
But we do have more than one century worth of experience with local
alcohol regulations. I argue that this experience holds some valuable
lessons for debates over marijuana localism. In particular, I suggest our
experience with local alcohol control should temper enthusiasm for
giving local government similar control over marijuana. The research
on local alcohol control suggests that local alcohol regulations often
have effects outside of the communities that adopt them.21 For example,
one community’s decision to go “wet” could thwart a neighboring dry
community’s efforts to curb alcohol consumption and the harms that
go along with it. Likewise, one community’s decision to go “dry” might
simply shift more alcohol consumption and its attendant harms into a
neighboring wet community. The sobering experience with local alcohol
control suggests that the state or even the national government might
be better suited to control alcohol and, by extension, perhaps marijuana
as well.
place in an enclosed, locked space, is not conducted openly or publicly,
and is not made available for sale”).
21.

See infra Part III.
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Importantly, the Article remains deliberately neutral regarding
whether marijuana distribution should be legal or illegal. It focuses
instead on who should decide. I contend that the answer to that
question ought to be the same regardless of its impact on the reach and
pace of legalization. The state should allocate policymaking authority
to whichever level of government is likely to please the largest number
of people. To be sure, presently, localism would appear to favor one
side—it enables prohibitionists to preserve islands of prohibition in
states where the tide has clearly turned against them. But it is
important to recognize that local power could just as easily be used to
legalize as to prohibit marijuana. Indeed, citing frustration with the
pace of state-level reforms, local communities in several states are now
attempting to legalize marijuana, notwithstanding state prohibitions on
the drug.22 Localism thus arguably holds some appeal for both sides in
marijuana policy debates. For this reason, if no other, it might be
possible for decisionmakers to allocate authority between state and
local governments without necessarily being influenced by expectations
of how that authority will be exercised at the present moment.
The Article could also generate important insights for marijuana
federalism. Since states too have porous borders, marijuana smuggling
22.

In Michigan, for example, eight cities recently voted to legalize possession
and distribution of recreational marijuana under city law; the state, so
far, has only legalized medical marijuana. See City of Berkley Marijuana
Decriminalization
Proposal
(November
2014),
Ballotpedia,
http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Berkley_Marijuana_Decriminalization
_Proposal_(November_2014); City of Hazel Park Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://bal
lotpedia.org/City_of_Hazel_Park_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Prop
osal_(August_2014); City of Huntington Woods Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/
City_of_Huntington_Woods_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Proposal
_(November_2014); City of Mount Pleasant Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/
City_of_Mount_Pleasant_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Proposal_(N
ovember_2014); City of Oak Park Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal
(November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Oak_
Park_Marijuana_Decriminalization_Proposal_(August_2014); City of
Pleasant Ridge Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014),
Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Pleasant_Ridge_Mari
juana_Decriminalization_Proposal_(November_2014); City of Port
Huron Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014),
Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Port_Huron_Marijuana
_Decriminalization_Proposal_(November_2014); City of Saginaw
Marijuana Decriminalization Proposal (November 2014), Ballotpedia,
http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Saginaw_Marijuana_Decriminalization
_Proposal_(November_2014).
In similar fashion, many local governments sought to legalize sales of
alcohol before the repeal of state and national prohibitions. See David E.
Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition 54 (2d ed. 2000).
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and marijuana tourism threaten to undermine satisfaction with their
policies as well. Indeed, Nebraska and Oklahoma have filed a lawsuit
against Colorado claiming the Rocky Mountain State has imposed
various costs upon its neighbors:
The diversion of marijuana from Colorado contradicts the clear
Congressional intent, frustrates the federal interest in eliminating
commercial transactions in the interstate controlled-substances
market, and is particularly burdensome for neighboring states like
Plaintiff States where law enforcement agencies and the citizens
have endured the substantial expansion of Colorado marijuana.23

For reasons I’ve explained elsewhere, marijuana federalism may pose
more of an academic question for now24—but it could resurface if
support for marijuana legalization continues to grow.25
In addition to contributing to the debate over marijuana law and
policy, this Article also adds to the body of localism scholarship.
Following in the footsteps of recent works analyzing local control of
domains as diverse as firearms and hydraulic fracturing,26 this Article
provides a case study to apply and refine the more abstract principles
of localism theory. Perhaps one of the most important takeaways from
these works is that the case for or against localism is rarely as clear cut
as in the highly stylized hypotheticals commonly employed in the
classroom.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the theoretical
framework for evaluating the desirability of local control. Part II
discusses the strength of the two competing considerations surrounding
the decision whether or not to grant local governments power to
regulate marijuana sales: (1) the distinctiveness of local marijuana
policy preferences; and (2) the impact of local marijuana sales on
outsiders. Part III then discusses the lessons of local alcohol control.
23.

Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No. 22O144 ORG, 6 (U.S. docketed
Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Complaint].

24.

See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1445–50
(explaining that the anticommandeering rule prevents Congress from
preempting state marijuana legalization).

25.

If it had the political support to pass new legislation, for example,
Congress could preempt state marijuana bans and force states to legalize
marijuana. See Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act,
supra note 17, at 15–17 (explaining that the anticommandeering rule does
not prevent Congress from preempting state interference with the private
market).

26.

See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L.J. 82 (2013)
(making a case for local control over firearm regulation—and providing
the inspiration for the title of this piece!); David B. Spence, The Political
Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 351, 377–78 (2014) (making
an equivocal case for local control over fracking).

726

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Marijuana Localism

Part IV makes some tentative recommendations concerning whether
states should devolve control of marijuana policy onto local
governments.

I.

Localism Theory

This Part provides a quick primer on localism theory. For purposes
of this Article, I focus on the economic theory of localism. This theory
strives to maximize total satisfaction with government policy.27 To that
end, it asks which level of government, state or local, would maximize
the combined utility of all residents of the state.28 Maximizing preference satisfaction is not, of course, the only—or, indeed, even necessarily
a good—rationale for localism,29 but it is one of the most commonly
invoked rationales for local control. So for now, I will focus exclusively
on localism’s impact on satisfaction with government policy, leaving
other considerations for another day.
Localism’s net impact on preference satisfaction depends on the
strength of two competing considerations.30 On the one hand, localism
27.

See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
Pol. Econ. 416, 416 (1956) (arguing that “local[ism] . . . reflects the
preferences of the population more adequately than they can be reflected
at the national level”); Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 11–13
(1972) (arguing that decentralization achieves a higher degree of preference satisfaction); Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter 152–54 (2013) (examining the informational benefits of “foot voting”).

28.

I recognize this is not the only method of aggregating preferences. See
Wulf Gaertner, A Primer on Social Choice Theory 9–12 (2006)
(discussing competing approaches).

29.

See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 487, 490 (1999) (arguing that local
governments are more than “insular forums for registering the private
preferences of the persons who inhabit them” and can serve as “important
political institutions that are directly responsible for shaping the contours
of ‘ordinary civic life in a free society’”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism:
Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 393–99
(1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part II] (discussing claims
that localism enhances political participation); Richard T. Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 1841, 1861 (1994) (arguing that “contemporary local government
law perpetuates the historically imposed segregation of the races”); Gerald
E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1067–68
(1980) (arguing that the case for localism “does not rest on the view that
local autonomy is the only, or even the most efficient, way to solve local
problems” and suggesting instead that localism is desirable because it
enables individuals “to participate actively in the basic societal decisions
that affect one’s life”).

30.

These two considerations are implicit in the theory’s conclusion that regulatory authority should be allocated to the smallest unit of government
that can capture the full costs and benefits of regulated activity. See
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could potentially boost preference satisfaction if local communities in
the same state disagree about policy. Each state is comprised of a large
number of local communities.31 When some of those communities
disagree with the way the state would handle an issue, localism enables
them to pursue the policy their own majorities would prefer.32 By giving
communities the opportunity to opt out of a state policy that some find
disagreeable, localism should satisfy a larger number of state residents
overall.33
Professor Michael McConnell has developed a helpful hypothetical
to illustrate the preference-satisfaction benefits of decentralization.34
Although McConnell originally used this hypothetical to make the
case for federalism, it is arguably even better suited to make the case
for localism.35 Adapted for that purpose, the hypothetical asks the
reader to

Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 137 (2010)
(arguing that power in a federal system should be assigned to “the
smallest unit of government that internalizes the effects of its exercise”).
See also Spence, supra note 26, at 377 (“There is a long tradition in
economics, positive theory, and other quasi-utilitarian traditions of
examining jurisdictional conflicts . . . using the matching principle, which
would house regulatory authority at the lowest level of government that
encompasses (geographically) the costs and benefits of the regulated
activity.”).
31.

Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1114 (2007)
(noting that there are more than 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities
dispersed across the fifty states).

32.

The assumption, of course, is that state government must apply the same
policy throughout the state. If this assumption does not hold—in other
words, if the state could adjust its own policy to suit local preferences—
the preference satisfaction benefits of localism would disappear. Cf.
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903 (1994) (arguing that the federal
government could achieve the same preference-satisfaction benefits
commonly attributed to federalism by simply adjusting federal policy to
suit state conditions).

33.

See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 29, at 375–78 (discussing
the posited comparative advantage of localism over federalism). See also
sources cited supra note 27.
Localism does not, of course, benefit everyone in a state and for that
reason is not Pareto efficient; instead, the idea is that the number of
people who gain from localism outnumber the number who lose, making
it Kaldor-Hicks efficient if we ignore the nettlesome problem of
interpersonal utility comparisons.

34.

Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1494 (1987).

35.

See Briffault, Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, supra note 9, at 1305 (arguing that “many . . . of [the] values
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assume that there are only two [cities], with equal populations of
100 each. Assume further that 70 percent of [City] A, and only
40 percent of [City] B, wish to outlaw smoking in public buildings.
The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a [state] basis
by a majority rule, 110 people will be pleased, and 90 displeased.
If a separate decision is made by majorities in each [city], 130 will
be pleased, and only 70 displeased.36

Mobility could further enhance preference satisfaction under localism. After all, residents who are unhappy with one locality’s policy
could potentially move to another locality that espouses a different,
more agreeable policy.37 McConnell notes in his example that “[t]he
level of satisfaction will be still greater if some smokers in [City] A
decide to move to [City] B, and some anti-smokers in [City] B decide
to move to [City] A.”38 To be sure, residents could also relocate to other
states as well as localities. But the relatively large number of localities
increases the odds that residents will find one with a more agreeable
policy and also reduces the costs associated with relocation across state
lines.39
On the other hand, localism could potentially diminish satisfaction
with government policy if some residents care about what happens
outside their home communities. For a variety of reasons, people
commonly do care about what is going on in other communities. For
example, those happenings might harm them physically—think of lung
disease caused by pollution emanating from a neighboring town’s
factory—as well as psychologically—think of the disgust felt upon
hearing of ISIS beheadings halfway across the globe. Judge David
Barron has aptly remarked that “no city or state is an island
jurisdiction. The ability of each locality to make effective decisions on
its own is inevitably shaped by its relation to other cities and
states . . . .”40
When people care about what happens elsewhere, localism will not
necessarily increase total satisfaction in the state and could even
diminish it. This is because localism requires surrendering a degree of
control over activities occurring elsewhere. In McConnell’s
hypothetical, for example, the people of City A could not ban smoking
said to be advanced by federalism . . . may be served better by local
governments than by states”).
36.

McConnell, supra note 34, at 1494.

37.

See, e.g., Somin, supra note 27, at 152–54 (noting the benefits of “foot
voting”).

38.

McConnell, supra note 34, at 1494.

39.

Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 29, at 400–35.

40.

David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke
L.J. 377, 378–79 (2001).
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in City B, nor could City B legalize smoking in City A. McConnell’s
case for decentralization thus rests on the assumption that the residents
of City A do not care about City B’s policy and vice versa. This might
be a fair assumption to make for an issue like smoking policy. But the
same assumption does not hold for policies governing other activities.
Imagine, for example, that City B decided to allow a local factory to
dump toxic pollutants into a river, contaminating the water supply of
downstream City A. Notwithstanding their apathy toward City B’s
smoking policy, the residents of City A would care about City B’s
pollution policy.41
Ultimately, the problem is that local communities have no incentive
to consider the costs and benefits of local activity that are borne by
outsiders.42 This means that the interests of local communities and the
interests of the entire state do not necessarily coincide, and we cannot
trust local communities to regulate activities in a way that will
maximize the total satisfaction of the entire state. In particular, when
local activity imposes costs on outsiders, local authorities will allow or
produce too much of it. (The example of the factory in City B polluting
City A’s water supply fits the bill). And when local activity instead
confers benefits on outsiders, local authorities will allow or produce too
little of it.
***
To summarize, localism enables each community to pursue the
policy that maximizes its own well-being. And as long as local activity
does not affect outsiders to the community, regulation motivated by
local interests will also maximize the well-being of the state. But when
local activity imposes costs or benefits on those outsiders, local
communities will not necessarily adopt the policies that maximize the
state’s well-being. The normative case for localism thus hinges on the
strength of two competing considerations: (1) the degree to which local
communities disagree about how to regulate a given activity, and (2)
the degree to which local communities absorb the full costs and benefits
of the regulated activity. Ceteris parabis, the stronger is the former
consideration, the stronger will be the case for local control. Conversely,
the stronger is the latter consideration, the stronger will be the case for
state control. I argue that states should consider these criteria when
deciding whether to grant local communities authority over marijuana.

41.

Economists label these concerns externalities, which, for present purposes,
are costs or benefits associated with a local activity or policy that are
borne by nonconsenting outsiders.

42.

See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 29, at 434 (“Local
governments will not, as long as they need not, take extralocal effects into
account, give a voice to nonresidents affected by local actions, internalize
externalities, make compensatory payments for negative spillovers or
transfer local wealth to other communities in the region to ameliorate
fiscal disparities.”).
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The next Part thus explores the strength of these two considerations
when it comes to marijuana sales.

II. Marijuana Localism
This Part evaluates the case for and against local control of
marijuana sales policy using the two economic criteria discussed above.
Namely, I examine the extent to which majority preferences toward
marijuana sales policy differ across local jurisdictions and the extent to
which local marijuana sales have effects outside the point-of-sale
community. As noted above, this is not meant to be an exhaustive list
of the criteria needed to evaluate marijuana localism. But these
economic considerations offer a good place to start our assessment of
the normative desirability of marijuana localism.
A.

The Case For

This Section demonstrates that local communities do indeed prefer
different policies toward marijuana sales. But it also suggests that the
gains associated with marijuana localism could prove to be small and
temporary.
It seems safe to posit that communities disagree about how to
regulate marijuana sales. The best evidence stems from the fact that
local communities have adopted starkly different policies toward
marijuana stores. In Colorado, for example, 165 municipalities have
voted to ban retail marijuana stores, but another fifty-three
municipalities have voted to permit them.43 Marijuana stores garnered
as little as 21 percent support and as much as 65 percent support in
the most recent round of local referenda.44 Even among Colorado
43.

See Murray & Aguilar, supra note 6 for a detailed breakdown of Colorado.

44.

In 2014, voters in eight Colorado cities considered local initiatives to
legalize marijuana stores as permitted by Amendment 64. Local Marijuana on the Ballot, Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Local_mari
juana_on_the_ballot. Majorities in two of those cities voted to approve
marijuana stores, while majorities in the other six cities voted to prohibit
them. Id. The cities and vote shares (prohibit-allow) are Cañon City (61–
39), Canon City Marijuana Legalization, Measure 2C (November 2014),
Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Ca%C3%B1on_City_Marijuana_
Retail_Legalization,_Measure_2C_(November_2014); Lakewood (54–
46), Town of Lakewood Marijuana Retail Ban, Measure 2A (November
2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_Lakewood_Mari
juana_Retail_Ban,_Measure_2A_(November_2014); Manitou Springs
(35–65), City of Manitou Spring Retail Marijuana Ban, Measure 2G
(November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/City_of_
Manitou_Springs_Retail_Marijuana_Ban,_Measure_2G_(November_
2014); Palisade (50.3–49.7), Town of Palisade Retail Marijuana
Legalization,
Measure
2A
(November
2014),
Ballotpedia,
http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_Palisade_Retail_Marijuana_Legalizat
ion,_Measure_2A_(November_2014); Palmer Lake (53–47), Town of
Palmer Lake Recreational Marijuana Retail Ban, Measure 301
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communities that allow marijuana stores, there is some differentiation
in policy. For example, only half of the fifty-three municipalities that
permit retail marijuana shops have chosen to levy special local taxes on
marijuana sales.45 And to varying degrees communities in Colorado and
elsewhere restrict the number, location, size, and hours of operation of
locally permitted marijuana stores.46
The passage of different policies arguably reflects the distinctive
beliefs, priorities, and conditions of local communities. To simplify
somewhat, communities that have banned marijuana dispensaries fear
the stores fuel marijuana consumption47 and all the harms they
attribute to it, and that they also attract “crime, congestion, blight,
and drug abuse”48 to surrounding neighborhoods. Communities that
allow dispensaries might share some of these concerns, but they prefer
less-draconian means to address them, for example, keeping stores away
from areas frequented by children.49 Communities that allow marijuana
stores also see an upside to them. The stores provide medicine for

(November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_
Palmer_Lake_Recreational_Marijuana_Retail_Ban,_Measure_301_(
November_2014); Paonia (53–47), Town of Paonia Marijuana Retail
Legalization Referendum, Measure 2B (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_Paonia_Marijuana_Retail_Le
galization_Referendum,_Measure_2B_(November_2014); Ramah (79–
21) Town of Ramah Marijuana Retail Legalization, Measure 2B
(November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/Town_of_
Ramah_Marijuana_Retail_Legalization,_Measure_2B_(November_20
14); and Red Cliff (36–64), Town of Red Cliff Marijuana Retail Ban,
Question 2G (November 2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/
Town_of_Red_Cliff_Marijuana_Retail_Ban,_Question_2G_(Novem
ber_2014).
45.

Murray & Aguilar, supra note 6.

46.

Nemeth & Ross, supra note 7, at 8–11 (cataloging the regulations imposed
on medical marijuana dispensaries by several communities across the
country).

47.

See Hunter Stuart, One-Quarter of Washington’s Towns Still Ban
Marijuana, The Huffington Post, Jul. 8, 2014 (“Having a retail
recreation store sends the wrong message to kids.”) (quoting Dale Brown).

48.

City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Ctr.,
Inc., 300 P.3d 494, 508 (Cal. 2013) (adopting argument made by amici
curiae to support a local ban on medical marijuana dispensaries). See also
Nemeth & Ross, supra note 7, at 7 (noting strong NIMBY opposition to
marijuana stores).

49.

See Nemeth & Ross, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that the “main intent” of
restrictions on the day to day operations of medical marijuana
dispensaries is “to limit feared secondary impacts” of the stores,
“especially crime, underage use, or diversion to the ‘black market’”).
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seriously-ill patients, recreation for consenting adults, tax revenues for
cash-strapped local governments, or jobs for local workers.50
The results of statewide elections further demonstrate the existence
of divergent local policy preferences in this domain. In statewide
elections, local communities have commonly staked out opposing
positions on marijuana ballot initiatives. Consider the vote on
Colorado’s Amendment 64. In total, more than one-half (55.3%) of
Colorado voters favored Amendment 64.51 But a majority of voters in
thirty out of Colorado’s sixty-four counties actually opposed
Amendment 64.52 Marijuana ballot initiatives in other states have
proven similarly divisive at the local level.53
Given these disagreements, localism theory suggests that more
people might be satisfied if their local government rather than the state
(or national) government controlled marijuana sales policy. The results
of those aforementioned statewide elections could even help estimate
the magnitude of the preference-satisfaction gains to be had from marijuana localism. To that end, I compared the number of people in the
local majority on state marijuana measures to the number of people in
the statewide majority on the same measures. The differences provide
a very rough approximation of the number of voters who might gain
from marijuana localism in the states. While this methodology has
obvious shortcomings, like ignoring the intensity of voter preferences
and ignoring policy alternatives not considered on state ballots, it
should generate some insight into the strength of the case for marijuana
localism.

50.

See id. at 7 (discussing perceived job and tax revenue rationale animating
local ordinances allowing marijuana dispensaries).

51.

Amendments and Proposition Results, Colorado Secretary of
State [hereinafter Colorado Amendments and Proposition Results],
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/2012/
general/amendProp.html (receiving 1,383,140 out of 2,500,034 votes).

52.

Id.

53.

For example, in California, twelve of fifty-eight counties supported
Proposition 19 in 2010. State Ballot Measures by County, California
Secretary of State (2010), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2010general/88-state-ballot-measures.pdf. In Washington, 20 of 39 counties
supported Initiative 502 in 2012. November 06, 2012 General Election
Results, Washington Secretary of State, (Nov. 27, 2012),
http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Initiative-Measure-No-502Concerns-marijuana_ByCounty.html [hereinafter Washington Voting
Results on Initiative 502]. Finally, in Oregon, 14 of 36 counties supported
Measure 91 in 2014. General Election, Official Abstract of Votes: Measure
91, Oregon Secretary of State (2014) [hereinafter Oregon Abstract
of Votes: Measure 91], http://www.oregonvotes.gov/doc/history/nov42
014/91.pdf.

733

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Marijuana Localism

Consider, first, the county-by-county vote on Colorado’s
Amendment 64.54 In the 2012 election, 1,383,140 Coloradoans voted for
Amendment 64 and were presumably satisfied with the outcome;
another 1,116,894 Coloradoans voted against Amendment 64 and were
presumably dissatisfied with the outcome.55 In total, a net 266,246 more
Coloradoans preferred the new state policy (legalization) over the old
one (prohibition). But the county-by-county vote suggests that even
more people would have been satisfied by localism. Majorities in thirty
of Colorado’s sixty-four counties actually opposed Amendment 64. In
these counties, the total number of “no” votes (215,973) exceeded the
total number of “yes” votes (181,369) by 34,604. This suggests that a
net of 34,604 Coloradoans might have been happier under localism.56
While the results on Amendment 64 might be indicative only of
Colorado circa 2012, the county-by-county votes on marijuana ballot
measures in other states tell a very similar story. Table 1 displays data
from four of the most recent statewide marijuana ballot initiatives in
which county level votes were readily available.57

54.

All of the Colorado election figures are pulled from State of Colo.,
Office of the Sec’y of State, 2012 Abstract of Votes Cast 145
(2012) [hereinafter Colorado Voting Results on Amendment 64],
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/2012/booklet
.pdf.

55.

Id.

56.

To put it another way, 34,604 is the difference between the sum of the
countywide majority vote on Amendment 64 (1,417,744) and the total
statewide majority vote on the Amendment 64 (1,383,140). Colorado
Voting Results on Amendment 64, supra note 54, at 145.

57.

All data in the table are pulled from Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement
of Vote: November 2, 2010, General Election 88–90 (2011)
[hereinafter California Voting Results on Proposition 19], http://elect
ions.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf;
Colorado
Amendments and Proposition Results, supra note 51; Oregon Abstract of
Votes: Measure 91, supra note 53; Washington Voting Results on
Initiative 502, supra note 53.

734

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Marijuana Localism
Table 1
Majority
voters at
state
level

Majority
voters at
county
level

Difference

California Prop 19 (2010)

5,333,230
53.5%

5,558,225
55.7%

224,995
2.3%

Colorado Amendment 64 (2012)

1,383,140
55.3%

1,417,744
56.7%

34,604
1.4%

847,865
56.1%

880,527
58.3%

32,662
2.2%

1,724,209
55.7%

1,770,284
57.2%

46,075
1.5%

State

Oregon Measure 91 (2014)

Washington I-502 (2012)

The second column shows the number and percentage of state voters
who were in the majority at the state level; the third column shows the
number and percentage of voters in the majority at the county level;
and the final column shows the difference between the first two figures,
which provides a rough approximation of the net increase in satisfied
voters under localism. As the table shows, to date, the number of
potential beneficiaries of marijuana localism expressed as a percentage
of state voters has been remarkably consistent across the states,
amounting to roughly 2 percent of a state’s voting population. This is
not a trivial gain, but it is far less than the 10 percent net gain posited
by McConnell’s hypothetical above.58 The gains from marijuana
localism appear to be somewhat small because opposition to state
legalization measures has been concentrated in more thinly populated
counties. In Colorado, for example, five of the seven smallest counties
but not one of the seven largest counties opposed Amendment 64.59
In theory, of course, the number of people who benefit from localism
would be even larger and the case for localism correspondingly stronger
if some dissatisfied residents relocated to communities espousing more
like-minded preferences toward marijuana regulation. After all,
estimating the number of people who benefit from localism using only
the votes they cast in an election fails to count anyone who benefits
from localism by voting with their feet instead.60 Nonetheless, I suspect
58.

In the hypothetical, twenty more voters out of 200 total were more
satisfied by local versus state control. See McConnell, supra note 34, at
1494.

59.

The ten smallest counties comprised only .23% of voters while the ten
largest counties comprised 66.9% of voters. Colorado Voting Results on
Amendment 64, supra note 54, at 145.

60.

See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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few people actually change residences solely on account of local
marijuana sales policy. For most people, marijuana is not an important
enough issue to justify incurring the costs of permanent relocation,61
especially when, as I suggest below, they can easily take advantage of
neighboring community’s laws without relocating there.
Likewise, the number of people who benefit from marijuana
localism could prove even smaller than the vote tallies suggested. One
reason is that preferences toward marijuana policy are rapidly
changing. The disagreements that now divide local communities could
resolve themselves over time, in which case localism would produce only
temporary gains.62 Consider, for example, how the controversy over
medical marijuana has largely disappeared among the general public.
More than 80 percent of Americans now support legalization of
marijuana for medical purposes.63 Localism might have held some
appeal for the medical marijuana issue twenty years ago when the
public was somewhat more divided, but that appeal has waned along
with opposition to medical use of the drug.64 In a similar way, localism
has arguably lost much of its appeal in the realm of alcohol policy. In
1935, nearly 1,000 counties voted to opt out of statewide legalization of
61.

GfK Pub. Affairs & Corporate Commc’ns, The AP-GfK Sept.
2014 Poll: All Questions, 19 (2014), http://surveys.ap.org/data/Gf
K/AP-GfK_Poll_September_2014_Topline_ALL.pdf (reporting that
12% of respondents consider laws regarding marijuana an “extremely
important” personal issue; 14% consider it a “very important” personal
issue; 24% consider it a “moderately important” personal issue; 21%
consider it “slightly important”; and 28% consider it “not at all
important”).

62.

To be sure, the passage of local policies might play a role in facilitating
such convergence of opinion. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy,
supra note 10, at 1471–72 (discussing the possible impact state marijuana
laws have had on public opinion toward the drug).

63.

See e.g., Survey: General Public, Christian Young Adults Divided On
Marijuana Legalization, Pub. Religion Research Inst., Apr. 25,
2013,
http://publicreligion.org/research/2013/04/april-2013-prri-rnssurvey/ (80% favor legalization of medical marijuana).

64.

Polls from the mid-1990s reveal that the public was more divided over
medical marijuana then than it is today. See, e.g., Wired/Merrill Lynch
Forum Digital Citizen Survey, Sept. 1997. Retrieved Jan-19-2015 from
the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research,
University of Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_acc
ess/ipoll/ipoll.html (62% favor legalizing medical marijuana); ABC News
Poll, May, 1997. Retrieved Jan-19-2015 from the iPOLL Databank, The
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of
Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll
.html (70% favor legalizing medical marijuana); Americans Assess
Medical Marijuana Survey, Mar, 1997. Retrieved Jan-19-2015 from the
iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research,
University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_acc
ess/ipoll/ipoll.html (22% favor legalizing medical marijuana).
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alcohol sales, but by 1970 that number had shrunk to around 600
counties,65 and it has continued to drop ever since.66
In sum, at first glance, marijuana localism looks appealing. Local
communities clearly disagree about how to regulate marijuana. It
appears that more people would be happy living under locally tailored
marijuana policies than would be happy living under a single
state-crafted marijuana policy, though the difference appears somewhat
small and may prove temporary. But the case for localism so far has
rested on the assumption that local voters do not care about marijuana
policies adopted outside their home jurisdictions. The next Part
challenges this assumption and thus casts doubt upon the normative
case for marijuana localism.
B.

The Case Against

Localism could potentially reduce overall satisfaction with
government policy if people care about the marijuana policies adopted
by other communities. This Section suggests there are at least two
reasons people will mind what other communities do. Marijuana users
can smuggle marijuana in from neighboring communities (marijuana
smuggling), and marijuana users can travel out to neighboring
communities to consume the drug (marijuana tourism). Both marijuana
smuggling and marijuana tourism threaten to undermine the efficacy
of many local controls and thus satisfaction with marijuana localism
among a large segment of the population.
1.

Marijuana Smuggling

In a world of divergent local marijuana policies, marijuana
smuggling could undermine all but the most lenient of them. All marijuana regulations impose costs on the drug. Marijuana prohibition
imposes risk premiums on those who supply the drug; these risk
premiums are passed along to consumers in the price of the drugs they
buy. Marijuana taxes and other business regulations, such as licensing
requirements, also raise the price of the drug, though perhaps to a lesser
extent. The problem for governments is that marijuana consumers have
strong incentives to avoid these costs, and the availability of cheaper
marijuana in neighboring jurisdictions—especially nearby local
jurisdictions—gives them an easy means by which to do so.
65.

Koleman S. Strumpf & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism, 110 J.
Pol. Econ. 1, 8–12 (2002) (providing data on a number of dry counties
from 1935 to 1970).

66.

See Reagan Baughman et al., Slippery When Wet: The Effects of Local
Alcohol Access Laws on Highway Safety, 20 J. Health & Econ. 1089,
1091–92 (2001) (reporting that from 1975 to 1996, thirty-three dry Texas
counties voted to legalize alcohol sales).
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For reasons both legal and practical, smuggling marijuana between
local communities is easy. To begin, local residents have a
constitutional “right to travel and to take advantage of the legal
entitlements of neighboring jurisdictions.”67 As Professor Seth Kreimer
eloquently explains,
[T]he American Constitution as reformulated after the Civil War
contemplates a national citizenship which gives to each of its
members the right to travel to other states where, on a basis of
equality with local residents, they can take advantage of the
economic, cultural and moral options permitted there. The effort
of any political subdivision of the nation to coerce its citizens into
abjuring the opportunities offered by its neighbors is an affront
not only to the federal system, but to the rights that the citizens
hold as members of the nation itself.68

Thus, a community may not bar its residents from buying marijuana
somewhere else, even if it chooses to ban marijuana inside its own
borders. For example, if Aurora, Colorado, prohibits retail marijuana
sales, it may not stop its residents from buying the drug next door in
Denver, where sales are legal.69
The United States Constitution would allow local governments to
bar the importation and possession of “noxious” goods in its borders,
but it appears that no state has yet actually empowered a local
community to ban the simple possession or even importation of
marijuana bought legally elsewhere in the state.70 In any event, even if
a state did allow localities to ban possession and transportation of
marijuana purchased in another community, residents would face little
practical difficulty buying marijuana elsewhere and bringing it back
home. The costs of making the trip to another community would be

67.

Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the
Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism,
67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 451, 462 (1992). See also I. Glenn Cohen,
Circumvention Tourism, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1309 (2012) (examining
comprehensively the right to travel to circumvent domestic prohibitions
on accessing certain medical services that are legal in the patient’s
destination country but illegal in the patient’s home country).

68.

Kreimer, supra note 67, at 519.

69.

Aurora only recently decided to lift its ban on marijuana retail stores. See
Carlos Illescas, Aurora to Start Pot Sales, but Stores Not Ready, The
Denver Post, Sept. 28, 2014, at 5B (reporting that Aurora lifted its ban
on October 1, 2014).

70.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

738

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Marijuana Localism

negligible71 as legal marijuana stores may sit just feet outside the
resident’s jurisdiction.72 Moreover, the marijuana could be easily
concealed for the trip home,73 meaning the resident would face little
risk of being caught by local police in possession of marijuana from
another jurisdiction. The resident could further limit this risk and the
size of the sanction she would face by limiting the quantities she
smuggles, which is only a minimal inconvenience, considering that even

71.

As Jonathan Caulkins points out, “[d]rugs are enormously valuable per
unit weight, so conventional transportation costs are negligible.” Jonathan P. Caulkins, Domestic Geographic Variation in Illicit Drug Prices,
37 J. Urb. Econ. 38, 39 (1995).

72.

For example, several of Denver’s 100+ licensed marijuana shops are
located just outside the city limits of Aurora. A map of Denver’s licensed
marijuana shops can be found at Retail Marijuana Licenses, Denver Bus. Licensing Ctr., http://www.denvergov.org/busin
esslicensing/DenverBusinessLicensingCenter/MarijuanaLicenses/RetailM
arijuana/tabid/445028/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
To be sure, not every community will be as closely situated to its
doppelganger as Denver and Aurora. And not surprisingly, smuggling
poses less of a concern for more isolated communities. See, e.g., Matthew
Berman et al., Alcohol Control and Injury Death in Alaska Native
Communities: Wet, Damp, and Dry under Alaska’s Local Option Law, 61
J. of Studies on Alcohol 311, 318 (2000) (concluding that
“community-based alcohol control under the Alaska local option law has
likely had some effect in moderating the elevated risk of injury death for
Alaska Natives living in small remote communities”); Darryl S. Wood &
Paul J. Gruenewald, Local Alcohol Prohibition, Police Presence and
Serious Injury in Isolated Alaska Native Villages, 101 Addiction 393,
400 (2006) (confirming the findings of earlier studies that local alcohol
prohibitions reduced violent crime among isolated Alaska Native American communities).

73.

See, e.g., Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., Arizona: Drug Threat
Assessment 22 (2003), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs6/63
84/6384p.pdf (noting that smugglers can conceal marijuana in “specially
designed hidden compartments within . . . vehicles . . . includ[ing] bumpers, tires, gas tanks, quarter panels, seats, spare tires, and engine
compartments [or] in duffel bags or luggage within the trunk or on the
floor or seat of the vehicle[, or by] commingl[ing] marijuana with
legitimate cargo such as fruits and vegetables”); Experts Say Drug Mules
Are Easy to Find, Hard to Catch, NBC News (May 30, 2013),
usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/30/18589533-experts-say-drugmules-are-easy-to-find-hard-to-catch?lite (“The stash spots can be
incredibly difficult to detect. Entire gas tanks can be removed and
replaced with a bundle of drugs, or a back bumper can be filled with
packages. Customs and Border Protection regularly announces seizures of
narcotics hidden in creative receptacles like statues of Jesus, shoe heels or
hair-spray cans.”).
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heavy users consume less than two grams daily.74 And in the unlikely
event she is caught with a small quantity of marijuana (say, twentyeight grams or less), the resident would, at worst, likely face only simple
possession charges.75 For all of these reasons, the expected sanction for
smuggling marijuana across local communities is likely to be extremely
low.76
Indeed, marijuana is commonly smuggled through less porous borders and across longer distances than those separating communities in
the same state. Much of the marijuana consumed in the United States
is smuggled all the way from Mexico,77 and states like Nebraska and
Oklahoma claim they have “dealt with a significant influx of Coloradosource marijuana” since the state legalized commercial sales of the
drug.78 Though it is wise to take such claims with a grain of salt, the
Colorado Department of Revenue itself estimates that out-of-state
residents bought between eight and ten tons of marijuana legally in

74.

Beau Kilmer et al., RAND Corp., Before the Grand Opening:
Measuring Washington State’s Marijuana Market in the Last
Year Before Legalized Commercial Sales 11–12 (2013).

75.

Even the federal government might treat this as a mere civil infraction,
at least the first time around. See 21 U.S.C. § 844a (2012) (authorizing
federal prosecutors to treat simple possession of one ounce or less of
marijuana as a civil infraction).

76.

Whether the expected sanction will be enough to deter such smuggling
depends on the difference in the price of marijuana in different communities. It is possible that communities could deter smuggling from neighboring communities imposing only slightly more lenient regulations because the price differential will be small. But deterring smuggling from
neighboring communities espousing significantly more lenient regulations
will be considerably more difficult.

77.

See Beau Kilmer et al., RAND Corp., Reducing Drug Trafficking
Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana
in California Help? 7, 16 (2010) (noting that “at least 50 percent of
the commercial-grade marijuana consumed in the United States comes
from Mexico”).

78.

Complaint, supra note 23, at 25; see also Brief in Support of Motion for
Leave to File Complaint at 8, Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No.
22O144 ORG (U.S. docketed Dec. 18, 2014) (“Since Amendment 64 took
effect, Plaintiff States’ law enforcement have encountered Colorado
marijuana on a routine basis, confirming that significant amounts of
Colorado-sourced marijuana are being diverted to Plaintiff States.”); id.
(“Amendment 64 . . . established Colorado as a marijuana source for the
rest of the country.”). See also Jonathan P. Caulkins et al.,
Considering Marijuana Legalization: Insights for Vermont and
Other Jurisdictions 136 (2015) (suggesting that legalizing marijuana
in tiny Vermont could “alter availability [of marijuana] for at least onequarter of the nation’s users”) (emphases added); id. at 137 (“Total
marijuana spending by out-of-state users living within a radius of 200
miles of Vermont could well reach or exceed $5 billion per year.”).
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Colorado in 2014,79 and it reports that out-of-staters comprised nearly
one-half of the roughly 2,500 customers served by a Denver marijuana
store in the course of a single week.80 Federal drug enforcement agencies
also report a nearly 400 percent increase in the number of seizures of
Colorado sourced marijuana destined for other states between 2009 and
2012—a period following the proliferation of medical marijuana stores
in Colorado but before the first recreational marijuana stores had even
opened their doors.81
For local communities and possibly even for states and nations, it
is just not feasible to prevent cheap marijuana from being smuggled
across their borders. In their suit against Colorado, for example,
Nebraska and Oklahoma claim they have had to invest substantial new
resources in their unsuccessful attempt to stem the tide of marijuana
flowing in from Colorado:
The result of increased Colorado-sourced marijuana being trafficked in Plaintiff States due to the passage and implementation
of Colorado Amendment 64 has been the diversion of a significant
amount of the personnel time, budget, and resources of the
Plaintiff States’ law enforcement, judicial system, and penal
system resources to counteract the increased trafficking and
transportation of Colorado-sourced marijuana.82

Not surprisingly, Nebraska and Oklahoma would probably prefer that
Colorado shut off the water at the spigot instead—recall that a single

79.

Miles K. Light et al., The Marijuana Policy Group, Market Size
and Demand for Marijuana in Colorado 26 (2014).

80.

Id. at 25 (reporting that 44.5% of the customers were out-of-staters). See
also Aaron Smith, Tourists Flock to Colorado to Smoke Legal
Weed, CNN Money (Aug. 22, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/2
2/smallbusiness/marijuana-tourism-colorado/ (reporting that a Colorado
marijuana shop owner attributed 70% of business to out-of-state
customers, with another shop owner attributing at least one-third).
While those out-of-staters did not necessarily take all of the marijuana
they bought in Colorado back home, Colorado’s restrictions on public
consumption of the drug made it tough for them to consume all of it in
Colorado. See Retail Marijuana Use Within the City of Denver,
Colorado: The Official Web Portal (last visited Jan. 31,
2015) https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/marijuanainfodenver/residentsvisitors (detailing limits imposed on the consumption of marijuana)
[hereinafter Denver Marijuana Use].

81.

Rocky Mountain HIDTA, The Legalization of Marijuana in
Colorado: The Impact 38 (2013) (comparing the number of interdiction seizures involving Colorado marijuana from 2005 to 2008 and 2009
to 2012).

82.

Complaint, supra note 23, at 26.
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marijuana store in Denver serves thousands of customers every week.83
But that preferred strategy is simply unavailable to local communities
and even states and nations when the source of a drug lay outside their
borders.
Marijuana smuggling threatens to undermine the policy objectives
of local communities and hence their satisfaction with localism. For one
thing, smuggling could undermine the efforts of some communities to
curb consumption of marijuana and all of the harms those communities
attribute (rightly or wrongly) to such consumption, including
intellectual and motivational impairment, heart attacks, psychoses,
traffic accidents, and moral corruption, to name a few.84 As explained
above, one goal of local regulation is to raise the price of marijuana and
thereby reduce its consumption among residents. But if local
regulations can be evaded by shopping at a marijuana store located in
the town next door, those local regulations will not work as intended.
And if local marijuana regulations do not actually work as intended,
marijuana localism will not boost preference satisfaction in communities
that adopt the regulations and might even diminish satisfaction.85

83.

As I have explained elsewhere,
Targeting suppliers as opposed to users has two obvious advantages.
First, there are far fewer of them. . . . Second, the penalties for cultivation
and distribution of marijuana are significantly higher than for simple
possession, the charge most users would face . . . meaning that expected
legal sanctions will be high even if the probability of being detected
by . . . law enforcement is not.
Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1467. See also
United States v. Osburn, 955 F.2d 1500, 1509 (11th Cir. 1992) (“If the
government concentrates on eliminating the problem early in the
distribution cycle, then it will be less necessary to control drug possession
later when the numbers of retailers and users has multiplied. In addition,
if the problem is addressed at an early stage, then it is less likely that the
drug will ever reach users, and the consequent problems of drug use would
be commensurately diminished.”).

84.

See Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana,
76 Fed. Reg. 40,552 (July 8, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. ch. II)
[hereinafter Denial of Marijuana Rescheduling] (discussing the harms that
the Drug Enforcement Agency attributes to marijuana use).
The reader might take a very different view of marijuana’s harms. But
the very premise of localism is that local governments ought to be allowed
to reach different conclusions about such matters. Some local communities
will base their policies on unsubstantiated views, but as long as they
absorb the full costs and benefits of their decisions, they should be allowed
to make that choice.

85.

See Edward L. Powers & Janet K. Wilson, Access Denied: The Relationship Between Alcohol Prohibition and Driving Under the Influence, 74
Soc. Inquiry 318, 318–19 (2004) (making the point for alcohol policy).
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To be sure, local communities could attempt to achieve some of
their policy objectives by means other than controlling the supply of
marijuana. For example, a community could establish more sobriety
checkpoints to combat driving under the influence. But many communities would not deem such measures to be perfect substitutes for source
controls. For one thing, as noted above, they might believe that
controlling marijuana at its source is a cheaper or more effective
strategy compared to combatting harmful behaviors associated with use
of the drug. In addition, harm-reduction measures like sobriety
checkpoints will not necessarily address all of the harms local residents
attribute to marijuana use; think of accidents that take place in the
home or the moral corruption some people believe inheres in the use of
substances like marijuana.
Local communities that ban the sale of marijuana might have more
luck deflecting the “crime, congestion, blight, and drug abuse” they
associate with dispensaries onto other communities. But as discussed in
more detail below, that does not represent a gain to society.86
In addition to undermining efforts to combat consumption, marijuana smuggling could also undermine efforts to collect local taxes on
the drug. Enthusiasm for marijuana legalization has been fueled at least
in part by the promise of new tax revenues from sales of legal
marijuana.87 Many states have already imposed their own taxes on the
drug, but local jurisdictions are now trying to get in on the act. As
noted above, twenty-seven of the fifty-three municipalities that have
legalized marijuana sales in Colorado have levied local add-on taxes on
sales of marijuana.88 For example, Denver imposes an 8.25% tax on
retail marijuana sales on top of Colorado’s 12.90% tax (for a combined
rate of 21.15%).89 Now suppose that Aurora decides to legalize commercial marijuana sales. But to capture some of Denver’s marijuana
86.

Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662,
687 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (condemning Iowa law limiting the
length of trucks on the state’s highways because it was designed to shift
traffic onto other states and thereby “promote Iowa’s safety and other
interests at the direct expense of the safety and other interests of
neighboring States”).

87.

See Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution, supra note 17, at
223–24 (noting the prospect of new tax revenue bolsters the appeal of
marijuana legalization).

88.

Murray & Aguilar, supra note 6.

89.

See Denver Dep’t of Fin., Denver Combined Tax Rates (201)
(observing that the combined tax rate for 2015 includes a 7.15% Denver
tax; a 1.00% RTD (Regional Transportation District) tax; and a 0.10%
Cultural Facilities District tax). It is worth noting that Colorado also
imposes a 15% excise tax on wholesale marijuana. See Colorado Dep’t of
Rev., Taxpayer Svcs. Div., Excise 23: Excise Tax on Retail Marijuana
(Apr. 2014), available at https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default
/files/Excise23.pdf.
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business, suppose Aurora decides not to impose its own local tax on the
drug.90 Since a portion of the state sales tax would be returned to
Aurora anyway, the city would not necessarily need to impose an
additional local tax to help fill its coffers.91 It would hardly be surprising
if some Denverites now made the short trip to Aurora to buy marijuana.
In so doing they could evade Denver’s comparatively steep local tax
and save a tidy sum in the process (marijuana costs roughly $200–400
an ounce).92 Indeed, in a recent report Professor Jonathan Caulkins and
his co-authors conclude that “the idea that individual states can
function as separate policy laboratories is optimistic.”93 They warn that
the budgetary impacts of legalizing marijuana in one state (Vermont)
“are highly uncertain and depend very much on what neighboring
states do about their own marijuana policies.”94 Indeed, they suggest
that “it might only take one of the lower 48 states breaking ranks and
charging low marijuana taxes to challenge tax collections in the other
states.”95 Experience with local tobacco cigarette taxes likewise suggests
local communities will have a very difficult time collecting marijuana
taxes that are out of sync with those imposed by nearby jurisdictions.
For example, it is estimated that roughly 75% of all tobacco cigarettes
consumed by New York City residents are purchased outside city limits
in order to evade the city’s steep cigarette taxes.96 At the very least,
the threat of smuggling likely imposes a ceiling on the effective tax rate
that any local community can realistically expect to collect on
marijuana.
Ultimately, the problem with marijuana localism is that marijuana
sold legally in one community imposes costs on other communities, and
90.

In fact, Aurora has decided to allow its newly legalized marijuana stores
to remain open three hours later than Denver rivals in order to attract
more business from Denver residents. See Illescas, supra note 69.

91.

See Legis. Council of the Colo. General Assemb., 2013 State
Ballot Information Booklet 19–27 (2013) (describing the allocation
scheme for state marijuana sales tax under Proposition AA).

92.

Philip Ross, Marijuana Costs in the US: How Black Market, Retail and
Medical Pot Prices Compare, Int’l Bus. Times (July 8, 2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-costs-us-how-black-market-retailmedical-pot-prices-compare-1622362.

93.

See Caulkins et al., Considering Marijuana Legalization, supra
note 78, at 115 (emphasis added).

94.

Id.

95.

Id. at 142.

96.

See Editorial, Cigarette Tax Burnout, The Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 2008,
at A14 (discussing how high state cigarette taxes often cause cigarettes
to be purchased out of state). The tax gap for state cigarette taxes is
generally lower. See Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution,
supra note 17, at 243–44 (discussing the findings of cigarette tax evasion
studies).
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the point-of-sale community will not necessarily consider these costs
when deciding how to regulate marijuana distribution.97 Nebraska and
Oklahoma have emphasized the smuggling concerns in their suit against
Colorado: “[m]arijuana flows from [the legal gap created by
Amendment 64] into neighboring states, undermining Plaintiff States’
own marijuana bans, draining their treasuries, and placing stress on
their criminal justice systems.”98 As one Nebraska Sheriff explains,
“Every time we stop somebody, that’s taking up my deputy’s time with
your Colorado pot. . . . We have to pay overtime, pay the prosecutor,
pay to incarcerate them, pay for their defense if they’re indigent.
Colorado’s taxing it, but everybody else is paying the price.”99 In light
of concerns over smuggling, there is no reason to expect that local
communities will necessarily adopt marijuana policies that boost
societal welfare.
2.

Marijuana Tourism

A related problem confronting local communities stems from marijuana tourism. Marijuana tourism occurs when residents travel to a
neighboring locality not only to buy marijuana but also to consume it
there as well. As noted above, residents have a constitutional right to
travel to other jurisdictions “to take advantage of the legal entitlements” thereof, including, presumably, the right to consume marijuana
to the same extent as locals.100
For the reasons discussed above, it is easy for residents to travel to
neighboring communities to buy marijuana. It is clear that marijuana
dispensaries do a brisk business with nonlocal residents.101 In addition
to dispensaries, other businesses have sprouted up to cater to the
marijuana tourism industry. For example, one tour bus operator is
offering regular $400 round-trip service from Dallas, Texas, to one of
Denver’s marijuana shops.102
Marijuana tourism threatens to impose costs on both home and
destination jurisdictions. For home jurisdictions, marijuana tourism
could create the same problems caused by marijuana smuggling even if
residents never smuggle the drug back home. The psychoactive
chemical found in marijuana (THC) can impair cognitive functioning
97.

In fact, the point-of-sale community might not even recognize some of
those “costs” as such. After all, it might allow marijuana sales precisely
because it has formed a more positive assessment of marijuana’s harms
than have its neighbors.

98.

Complaint, supra note 23, at 3–4.

99.

See Marc Fisher, A Dividing Line, Wash. Post, July 26, 2014, at A1
(quoting Nebraska Sheriff Mark Overman).

100. See Kreimer, supra note 67, at 462.
101. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
102. Smith, supra note 80.
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for hours, some even claim weeks, after use.103 Hence, it is possible that
marijuana could impair driving, learning, productivity, and so on in
one community long after it was consumed somewhere else. For
example, a Colorado Springs resident might legally consume marijuana
at a club in Denver, then drive seventy miles back home and strike a
pedestrian in Colorado Springs. The harm to Colorado Springs is the
same regardless of where the consumption occurred.
Even long after the acute effects of marijuana wear off, users might
experience latent harms caused by long-term chronic use of the drug.
Under the right circumstances, these latent harms could cause concerns
in outside communities. For example, suppose a young Colorado
Springs resident goes on regular weekend marijuana binges in Denver;
now suppose she takes no physical risks while there, but after several
months of heavy use, she suffers permanent neurological damage. As a
result, she might need medical care, special tutoring, and other social
services—all paid for by her domicile (Colorado Springs) rather than
by her weekend destination (Denver).
More controversially, the use of marijuana by local residents in
neighboring communities could also cause moral harms back home.
Some people object to drug use by others for religious or other moral
reasons. To them, drug use constitutes a sinful indulgence, a debasement of the soul (to paraphrase James Q. Wilson).104 They feel morally
indignant when other people use drugs, whether or not such drug use
causes them, or anyone else, physical injury.105 Even readers who do not
share this worldview might empathize a bit by thinking of the grief or
103. Bengt Halvorson, Pot Smoking Could Affect Driving for Weeks,
Researchers Suggest, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2013, http://www.washing
tonpost.com/cars/pot-smoking-could-affect-driving-for-weeks-researchers
-suggest/2013/03/05/1e10733e-85c5-11e2-a80b-3edc779b676f_story.html
aw (reporting on a study that indicates that “cannabis can be detected in
the blood, at a level that might affect driving, for weeks after the last
‘intake’”). See also Denial of Marijuana Rescheduling, supra note 84, at
40582 (citing studies suggesting that marijuana use can affect airplane
pilot performance even twenty-four hours after consumption).
104. James Q. Wilson, Against the Legalization of Drugs, Commentary, Feb.
1990, at 21, 26 (“Tobacco shortens one’s life, cocaine debases it. Nicotine
alters one’s habits, cocaine alters one’s soul.”). See also William Bennett,
The Plea to Legalize Drugs Is a Siren Call to Surrender, in Drugs and
Society 339 (Michael Lyman & Gary Potter eds., 1991) (“The simple
fact is drug use is wrong. And the moral argument, in the end, is the most
compelling.”).
105. The widespread rejection of harm-reduction drug policies in the United
States suggests that many people might care more about these moral
harms than about the physical harms associated with drug use. See
Wilson, supra note 104, at 26 (arguing that because “dependency on
certain mind-altering drugs is a moral issue and [because] their illegality
rests in part on their immorality, then legalizing them undercuts, if it
does not eliminate altogether, the moral message”).
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anger felt when hearing about racial bigotry, animal cruelty, greed, or
other behaviors that occur elsewhere. To be sure, the law says that
locals have no right to regulate their residents extra-territorially. And
that may be a good rule from a normative perspective. But like many
constitutional rules, it is not a rule designed to maximize preference
satisfaction. It suggests that we should ignore some preferences (like
my preference that you not use marijuana in your town), not satisfy
them.
It is quite likely that marijuana prohibitions are motivated at least
in part by majority judgments that the use of this mind-altering drug
is immoral and not just (or even) physically dangerous.106 Residents
espousing such moral judgments might be no better off under localism,
and might even be worse off if they could command a majority
statewide, because local control does not enable them to block or
condemn troublesome conduct occurring in other parts of their state.
To the extent that moralistic reasoning drives marijuana policy preferences, it also undermines the claim that marijuana localism will necessarily boost preference satisfaction.
Marijuana tourism could also undermine the interests of tourist
destinations, notwithstanding the business it generates for them. Call
this the “crashing the party problem.” For one thing, marijuana tourism enables outsiders to enjoy many of the benefits that tourist
destinations generate without paying the full costs of those benefits.107
Marijuana destinations like Denver are supplying a drug that has
medical value, recreational value, or both to nonresidents. To illustrate,
suppose that Colorado Springs bans marijuana shops and Denver allows
them; suppose as well that some Colorado Springs residents enjoy using
marijuana and make the short trek to Denver to buy and consume the
drug. In this case, local activity in Denver is conferring an external
benefit on the community of Colorado Springs. Denver cannot easily
charge outsiders for this benefit. Neither can it recoup the costs those
outsiders inflict while in Denver. For example, after consuming
marijuana, those Colorado Springs residents might cause accidents,
brawls, and other disorderly conduct that harms the citizens of Denver.
106. Research on the determinants of preferences toward alcohol policy is
instructive. See infra note 123 and accompanying text (finding correlations between religious beliefs and preferences toward alcohol policy). In
particular, Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee posit the following possibility:
[D]ry voters prefer to ban sales in all districts because they oppose
drinking for moral reasons. These voters may oppose decentralization because they are worse off if other individuals drink.
Similarly, wet voters may be opposed to restricting the sale of
liquor in any district if they feel that such restrictions impair the
way of life that is typical for members of their group.
Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 14.
107. In other words, tourists from other jurisdictions engage in free-riding.

747

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
Marijuana Localism

In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that outsiders will create more
problems than locals because (1) their connection to the local
community is weaker, so they feel less inhibited while there; (2) their
lack of familiarity with the local environment may make them more
prone to accidents; (3) they have to travel farther than residents to
consume marijuana, so they might drive longer distances under the
influence of marijuana;108 (4) they may be more inclined to overindulge
since they have limited access back home; and (5) on average, tourists
may be less experienced with marijuana use and thus more susceptible
to—or simply less aware of—its psychoactive effects.
Legal and economic forces arguably prevent tourist destinations
from satisfactorily addressing the burdens imposed by outsiders. As
discussed, tourist destinations may not deny outsiders the legal
privileges they confer upon their own residents.109 In other words, once
a community allows its own residents to buy and consume marijuana
it must allow non-residents to do so on the same terms.110 For example,
a community may not charge outsiders a discriminatorily high tax on
legal marijuana purchases.111 To be sure, communities can make it
comparatively difficult to consume marijuana locally. For example,
Denver, like many other jurisdictions that allow marijuana sales,
nonetheless prohibits public consumption of the drug. According to the
city’s retail marijuana use FAQ page,
Retail marijuana is intended for private, personal use . . . . [I]t is
illegal to consume marijuana in public. This includes but is not
limited to areas accessible to the public such as transportation
facilities, schools, amusement/sporting/music venues, parks,
playgrounds, sidewalks and roads and outdoor and rooftop cafes.
It is also illegal to smoke at indoor-but-public locations like bars,
restaurants and common areas in buildings.112

108. Cf. Israel Colón, County-Level Prohibition and Alcohol-Related Fatal
Motor Vehicle Accidents, 14 J. Safety Res. 101, 103–04 (1983) (reporting that states with county level alcohol prohibitions actually have higher
levels of car fatalities, possibly because drinkers from dry counties must
drive farther to obtain alcohol).
109. See generally Denning, supra note 17 (discussing the constitutional limits
on state government power to discriminate against out-of-state residents’
purchases of marijuana).
110. See id. at 2283–98 (discussing the constitutional limits on a state’s ability
to discriminate against nonresidents).
111. Cf. id. at 2285.
112. Denver Marijuana Use, supra note 80. Bans on public consumption are
reminiscent of the early anti-saloon laws that both pre- and post-dated
Prohibition. For a discussion of this early anti-saloon movement, see
Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition 83–
95 (2010) (chronicling the efforts of the temperance movement)..
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Such bans on public consumption arguably encourage buyers to
consume marijuana in the privacy of their own homes, which, in the
case of tourists, often means somewhere outside the confines of the
point-of-sale community. But tourists still have several options for
consuming marijuana near the point of sale, including on marijuana
tour buses, in member-only clubs, and in marijuana-friendly hotels.113
In any event, tourists and residents alike probably face minimal legal
risk using marijuana in public, as long as they do so discreetly—for
example, by using odorless and smokeless marijuana vaporizer pens.114
Neither can tourist destinations easily recoup the costs that
nonresidents might impose on them. Destinations like Denver do, of
course, generate tax revenues from marijuana tourism.115 But it is
difficult for any destination to charge nonresidents a sufficiently high
Pigouvian tax to fully compensate for the unique costs they impose. To
begin, as noted, destinations cannot simply charge nonresidents a
higher tax rate than locals, even if those nonresidents are likely to inflict
more harm than locals.116 To recoup its full costs, a destination
community would need to raise taxes on its own residents as well. But
as discussed above, imposing local marijuana taxes creates its own set
of problems; namely, the tourist destination might simply drive its own
residents to purchase marijuana elsewhere. The scenario depicts a
classic collective action problem; communities absorb the harms of local
activity, but they are unable to exclude outsiders from enjoying the
benefits of that activity.117

113. See 60 Minutes: Colorado Welcomes Cannabis-Curious Tour (CBS News
television broadcast Jan. 11, 2015), available at http://www.cbs
news.com/news/colorado-welcomes-cannabis-curious-tourists/ (reporting
on Denver amenities such as marijuana tour buses and “bud and
breakfast” establishments).
114. See Miles Bryan, Pot Smoke and Mirrors: Vaporizer Pens Hide Marijuana
Use, NPR, (Apr. 18, 2014, 12:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/
blogs/health/2014/04/18/302992602/pot-smoke-and-mirrors-vaporizerpens-hide-marijuana-use (noting that many public smokers use handheld
vaporizers or vape pens because they are “easy to hide”).
115. See Denver Rev. Mun. Code § 53-86 (declaring that Denver’s
marijuana tax is designed to pay the expenses of, inter alia, “public health
programs to mitigate any negative consequences associated with the
consumption of marijuana”). See also Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana
Distribution, supra note 17, at 226–32 (discussing the rationale behind
vice taxes).
116. Such discrimination would plainly violate the dormant commerce clause,
though Brannon Denning makes a strong case that not all discrimination
against outsiders would violate the Constitution. See Denning, supra note
14, at 2298–99 (arguing that discriminatory quantity limitations could
survive constitutional scrutiny).
117. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 30, at 117 (“When activities spilled over
from one state to another, the Framers recognized that the actions of
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The residents of communities that legalize marijuana might be
aggrieved for a second reason as well. They cannot travel and enjoy
easy access to marijuana in other communities that prohibit sales of
drug. In other words, they cannot take their home communities’
privileges into neighboring communities and must abide by their
disagreeable laws. Not surprisingly, these residents do not want to be
denied access to a drug that gives them joy, medical relief, or both.118
Thus, while they might be pleased if their local community permits the
distribution of marijuana, they might be even happier if the entire state
(or nation) were to do the same. In other words, marijuana localism
will not necessarily improve their well-being vis-à-vis federalism or
nationalism because they too are not necessarily indifferent to how their
neighbors regulate the drug.
***
In sum, the desirability of marijuana localism hinges on empirical
claims about the extent to which local communities disagree about
marijuana policy and the extent to which local governments can
address the concerns that matter to their residents. On the one hand,
local majorities clearly disagree about how best to regulate marijuana
sales. Localism would thus appear to boost satisfaction in communities
that would disagree with the way their state would regulate such sales.
But the appeal of localism may prove illusory. The mobility of
marijuana and of its users undermines the efficacy of any local controls.
In other words, localism will not necessarily give people what they
really want—like a reduction in marijuana consumption or an increase
in tax revenues or an increase in access to the drug. It is thus not safe
to assume that local majorities have something to gain from localism,
or that statewide majorities have nothing to lose by acceding to it.

III. The Lessons from Alcohol Localism
The normative desirability of local marijuana regulation hinges to
a great extent on an empirical assessment of the external effects of local
marijuana activity. There is, as yet, far too little research examining
the effects of local marijuana activity on outside communities to
provide much guidance on the local option question. Fortunately,
individually rational states produced irrational results for the nation as a
whole—the definition of a collective action problem.”).
118. See Pat Oglesby, Laws to Tax Marijuana, Tax Analysts, Jan. 24, 2011,
at 255 (“The theory behind medical marijuana is hard to reconcile with
local option, at least for possession. It’s hard for a state to say sick people
in only some of its localities can use medicine.”). See also Strumpf &
Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 14 (acknowledging that “wet voters
may be opposed to restricting the sale of liquor in any district if they feel
that such restrictions impair the way of life that is typical for members
of their group”).
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however, we can look to other policy domains for answers. Alcohol
policy is one promising candidate. In this Part, this Article mines
research on the nation’s lengthy experience with local alcohol control
for insights into the desirability of similar local control over marijuana.
Local communities have long regulated the sale and even possession
of alcoholic beverages. Following the demise of national Prohibition,
the temperance movement succeeded in securing the local option in
thirty out of forty-two states that had legalized alcohol by 1935.119 In
little time, nearly 1,000 localities had exercised their option to ban
alcohol sales.120 Though the popularity of outright prohibition has
waned over time,121 some communities continue to ban sales of alcohol
and others impose a variety of less onerous restrictions on distribution.
The result is a patchwork of dry, damp, and wet communities in local
option states.
The existence of this patchwork of regulations suggests that local
communities disagree about the desirability of alcohol distribution and
what government should do about it. Indeed, studies demonstrate that
local decisions to legalize or prohibit alcohol sales reflect “the
characteristics and preferences of county voters, such as religious affiliation, political ideology, economic interests associated with alcohol
availability, alcohol restrictions in surrounding counties, and demographic factors.”122 For example, some Protestant denominations are
firmly opposed to the consumption of alcohol, and communities where
those denominations command a majority are more likely to ban the
sale of alcohol outright.123 In their study of local alcohol policies,
Professors Koleman Strumpf and Felix Oberholzer-Gee also find
evidence that preference heterogeneity drives support for localism itself:
We argue that a state’s choice of whether or not to decentralize
liquor control is related to the degree of preference heterogeneity,
119. See Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 5–8.
120. See id. at 10.
121. See id. at 8–10 (reporting that total number of dry counties fell by roughly
40% between 1935 and 1970). See also Baughman et al., supra note 66
(reporting that thirty-three dry Texas counties voted to legalize alcohol
sales between 1975 and 1996).
122. Robert W. Brown et al., Endogenous Alcohol Prohibition and Drunk Driving, 62 S. Econ. J. 1043, 1046 (1996).
123. Id. at 1048 (finding a positive correlation between Baptists’ percentage of
population and county’s dry status); see also Kenneth J. Meier & Cathy
M. Johnson, The Politics of Demon Rum: Regulating Alcohol and Its
Deleterious Consequences, 18 Am. Pol. Q. 404, 413 (1990) (finding a
positive correlation between reformist groups’ percentage of population
and dry status); Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 22–23
(finding a positive correlation between Baptists’, Calvinists’, and
Methodists’ percentage of population and dry status).
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and we have found empirical support for this conclusion using a
rich data set over the period 1934–70. The logic underlying the
economic theory of federalism appears to drive actual policy
choices.124

Given these heterogeneous preferences toward alcohol policy, it would
appear that alcohol localism could satisfy more voters.
But it arguably takes more than passing laws to boost preference
satisfaction. After all, people want to see results from these laws.125 And
whether local alcohol controls deliver the results people want depends
to a large degree on whether local alcohol policies have effects on
neighboring communities. On that score, the same obstacles I argued
might prevent local communities from successfully controlling
marijuana would presumably also prevent them from successfully
controlling alcohol. Namely, alcohol could be smuggled from
neighboring communities, though perhaps not quite as easily as
marijuana; and alcohol could be consumed in neighboring communities,
probably even more easily than marijuana. Given the similar obstacles
confronting marijuana and alcohol localism—and the similar objectives
animating controls—the nation’s experience with local alcohol
regulation provides a good test of the efficacy and desirability of local
marijuana controls as well.
So do local alcohol controls actually work? Social scientists have
conducted a number of studies examining the impact of local access
controls on alcohol consumption and other variables of interest, especially traffic fatalities. I scoured research databases to track down any
study estimating the impact of local option laws on two key variables
of interest—alcohol consumption and alcohol related traffic harms.
While the studies I found are not unanimous, they find surprisingly
little evidence that the local option actually has the desired impact on
consumption and harms, arguably because alcohol is commonly
available in neighboring communities.
First, consider the impact of local access controls on the
consumption of alcohol. While prohibitions and restrictions on the sale
of alcohol are designed in large part to curb alcohol consumption,126
local access controls appear to have little if any demonstrable impact.
In one study, Professors Kenneth Meier and Cathy Johnson examined
the impact of both local alcohol prohibitions and statewide sales
124. Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 32.
125. See Powers & Wilson, supra note 85, at 318–19 (“If prohibition has the
potential to limit individual freedom, stunt economic growth, and
stigmatize a community, it is reasonable for residents to expect certain
benefits in return. If no effectiveness can be demonstrated, the level of
control exercised over members of the community may be unwarranted.”).
126. See id. at 323 (“The primary emphasis of countywide prohibition is to
reduce drinking by denying access to alcohol.”).
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restrictions on statewide per capita consumption of alcohol (among
other things),127 controlling for relevant demographic characteristics.
The authors found no statistically significant relationship between the
percentage of a state’s population living in a dry county and the state’s
per capita alcohol consumption.128 By contrast, they did find that state
imposed sales regulations were associated with lower alcohol
consumption.129 In a similar, earlier study, Professor Julian Simon
likewise failed to find any relationship between a state’s dry population
and the consumption of liquor in the state.130
To be sure, scholars have established a positive relationship
between access to alcohol and alcohol consumption. For example, Carla
Campbell and her coauthors reviewed five studies of the impact of
outlet density, i.e., the number of alcohol vendors per capita, on
consumption and reported that all of them found “increased density
was associated with increased consumption, and vice versa.”131 As the
authors note, however, it is not clear what caused the differences in
outlet density in the first instance,132 thus making it impossible to credit
local policies for the reduction in alcohol consumption. After all, these
communities might have fewer alcohol outlets because they have less
demand for alcohol, and not because they legally limit the number of
vendors.
Local alcohol bans may have only muted impact on consumption
because residents of dry counties can easily obtain alcohol in neighboring communities. Campbell and her coauthors found support for this
hypothesis by comparing the impact of local alcohol bans in isolated
versus less isolated communities.133 In the former, consisting of isolated
Alaskan villages, residents faced far greater difficulty obtaining alcohol
127. See Meier & Johnson, supra note 123, at 406.
128. Id. at 419 (claiming that “[t]he model explains 86% of variation in per
capita alcohol sales” and that “[t]hree policies have no impact on the level
of alcoholic beverage consumption—dry population, tax rates, and
treatment facilities”).
129. Id. (noting that “[a]lcohol sales regulation, on the other hand, has a
significant negative impact on alcoholic-beverage sales”).
130. Julian L. Simon, The Economic Effects of State Monopoly of PackagedLiquor Retailing, 74 J. Pol. Econ. 188, 193 (1966) (“It is . . . surprising
that percentage of population in ‘dry’ counties was not significant, even
though there must be some sociological relationship between prohibition
and consumption.”).
131. Campbell et al., The Effectiveness of Limiting Alcohol Outlet Density as
a Means of Reducing Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-Related
Harms, 37 Am. J. Preventative Med. 556, 560 (2009).
132. See id. at 559 (noting that prior studies “directly evaluated the effect of
changes in outlet density over time without identifying the causes for
density changes”).
133. Id. at 564.
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in violation of strict local prohibitions. Not surprisingly, “[a]ll of the
studies that evaluated the effect of bans in isolated northern
communities found substantial reductions in alcohol-related harms with
the exception of suicide.”134 But less encouragingly, for localism
proponents, Campbell and her coauthors also found that bans adopted
by less-isolated communities produced at best “mixed results.”135 The
authors concluded that “[t]he effectiveness of bans in reducing alcoholrelated harms appears to be highly dependent on the availability of
alcohol in the surrounding area.”136
Consider, next, the impact local controls appear to have on drunk
driving and the injuries caused thereby. Drunk driving constitutes one
of the most salient harms of alcohol consumption and one of the
primary rationales for restricting access to alcohol.137 The problem is
that there is little evidence that local prohibitions on the sale of
alcohol—the strictest control a locality could adopt—actually reduce
the rate of drunk-driving harms in a state. It appears that local access
controls either do not curb drunk driving in dry counties—hardly
surprising, given the limited impact they have on consumption, as
noted above—or else they simply displace this harm onto neighboring
wet counties.
Researchers have examined the potential impact of local bans on
local accident rates. Early studies in this vein produced mixed results.138
134. Id. at 563. See also Berman et al., supra note 72, at 315 (noting that
“[m]ore restrictive measures (dry) have no effect on suicide rates,” but
“[a]ccident and homicide death rates fall . . . in the group of communities
going dry”); Wood & Gruenewald, supra note 72, at 400 (noting that
while “dry villages were safer than wet villages . . . the incidence of selfharm was similar for wet and dry villages”).
135. Campbell et al., supra note 131, at 563. Campbell et al.’s assessment of
local controls might have been even more dismissive had they also
reviewed the Meier & Johnson and Simon studies discussed above.
136. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
137. See, e.g., Donald S. Kenkel, Drinking, Driving, and Deterrence: The
Effectiveness and Social Costs of Alternative Policies, 36 J. L. & Econ.
877, 877 (1993) (“It is estimated that alcohol is involved in approximately
half of all fatal accidents. The deaths and injuries of nondrinking drivers,
passengers, and pedestrians both arouse public opinion and provide a
clear-cut efficiency rationale for policies to correct the negative
externalities.”); Powers & Wilson, supra note 85, at 323 (“The primary
emphasis of countywide prohibition is to reduce drinking by denying
access to alcohol. By logical extension, the reduction of drinking should
result in fewer alcohol-related problem behaviors such as DUI.”).
138. See, e.g., Russell G. Winn & David Giacopassi, Effects of County-Level
Alcohol Prohibition on Motor Vehicle Accidents, 74 Soc. Sci. Q. 783,
784 (1993) (“The few studies [to date] that have specifically examined
the impact of consensual local prohibition (dry by choice) come to very
different conclusions about its effectiveness in reducing alcohol-related
problems.”).
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In one study, for example, Professors Thomas Dull and David
Giacopassi modeled the impact of different local access controls on
automobile fatalities and other harms in Tennessee’s ninety-five
counties.139 In one model, the authors found that county-level prohibitions actually increased fatalities, and they hypothesized this could be
“a result of individuals leaving their dry county to drink in damp or
wet counties and being killed in auto crashes on their way home.”140 In
another model, they found no relationship between county prohibitions
and fatalities, thereby lending no support for the notion that local bans
actually reduce driving harms—though also undermining their finding
that local prohibitions could actually increase them.141 In a subsequent
study, Professors Russell Winn and David Giacopassi examined the
impact of local prohibitions on average automobile accidents in
Kentucky over a four-year period and found that “dry counties have
significantly lower rates of nonfatal and property accidents,”142 but not
fatal accidents, after controlling for demography, geography, and police
budgets.143 The authors concluded that “whether a county is wet or dry
does affect the rate of automobile crashes. However, caution is in order
since numerous factors other than alcohol availability affect the rate of
automobile accidents.”144 In a similar study, Professor Robert Brown
and his coauthors analyzed average traffic fatalities in Texas’s 254
counties from 1988 to 1992.145 The authors categorized each county as
either wet (201) or dry (53) circa 1993 and again controlled for
demography, geography, and police budgets.146 In a refinement of the
Winn and Giacoppassi study, however, Brown and his coauthors also
139. See R. Thomas Dull & David J. Giacopassi, Dry, Damp, and Wet: Correlates and Presumed Consequences of Local Alcohol Ordinances, 14 Am.
J. Drug Alcohol Abuse 499, 502–05 (1988) (describing the methodology of the study).
140. Id. at 505.
141. See id. at 507 (noting that their “findings suggest that factors other than
the alcohol ordinance may be primarily responsible for many of the socalled alcohol-related conditions and behaviors.”).
142. Winn & Giacopassi, supra note 138, at 790.
143. Id. at 788 (“The variables include population density, percentage of
county population which belongs to a church, per capita income,
percentage of population below poverty line, miles of roads, percentage of
roads classified as primary, police officers per 1,000 population, police
officers per mile of road, and percent minority.”).
144. Id. at 791.
145. Brown et al., supra note 122, at 1048 (“Fatal alcohol-related motor vehicle
accidents are averaged over five years (1988–92), in order to minimize any
random yearly fluctuations, and then divided by the number of lane miles
of road in a county.”).
146. Id. at 1047–49.
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attempted to address concerns over endogeneity, namely, the possibility
that “[o]bserved variations in alcohol-related behavior may reflect
differences in the characteristics of voters, rather than differences in
how individuals react to policy-induced changes in their constraints.”147
Using a measure of the local tourism industry as a proxy for demand
for drunk driving,148 the authors found that county prohibitions had a
statistically significant impact on alcohol-related fatalities.149
These early studies of the local impact of county prohibitions
arguably suffered from several shortcomings discussed below. More
recent studies of county-level effects arguably address these
shortcomings and consistently find little support for the proposition
that local alcohol prohibitions actually curb drunk-driving-related
harms. In a 2001 study, for example, Professor Reagan Baughman and
his coauthors re-examined the impact of local access controls in Texas
on automobile fatalities.150 The authors made three refinements to the
Brown study noted above. First, they examined automobile fatalities
over a twenty-one-year period, whereas the Brown study examined only
five years of data and further averaged yearly accident rates over that
period—a problem given several changes to Texas law during that
span.151 Second, Baughman and his coauthors used county-specific fixed
effects to account for the effects of unobservable variables—that is,
effects that might be mistakenly attributed to local prohibitions or
other observable variables (such as tourism).152 Like other researchers,
147. Id. at 1043–44.
148. See id. at 1047 (“The percentage of county population employed in the
tourism industry, presumably highly dependent on alcohol sales, is used
to measure the extent to which industry forces can affect alcohol availability.”).
149. Id. at 1049 (estimating the effect “crudely translates into 2.145 more fatal
alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents per year for the average [wet]
county”).
150. Baughman et al., supra note 66.
151. See id. at 1091 (noting the study included accidents from 1975 to 1996).
In particular, the Brown et al. study uses average yearly fatalities from
1988 to 1992 as the dependent variable and legal status in 1993 as the
independent variable. See Brown et al., supra note 122, at 1047–48
(noting that while “other factors” are presumed “constant,” the study
observes the variation of the average of “[f]atal alcohol-related motor
vehicle accidents”). The problem is that the legal status of at least
fourteen of those counties changed during the time period between 1988
and 1992. See Baughman et al., supra note 66, at 1092 (reporting the
legal status changes in Fig. 1). It is worth noting that other studies have
similarly employed averages of harm statistics, but the Baughman et al.
study does not.
152. Baughman et al., supra note 66, at 1090 n.4 (noting that “Brown et
al. . . . use[s] local tourism as an instrument for alcohol policy” and that
“[w]ithout a county fixed effect, local tourism revenue may not be a valid
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the authors also controlled for key observable variables that could
impact drinking and driving, including the “number of registered
vehicles, highway expenditures, police expenditures, religious
affiliations, population, per-capita income, and vehicle miles driven.”153
Including county-specific fixed effects, the authors found the correlation
between dry status and reductions in alcohol-related accidents to be
“spurious.”154 They concluded that local dry status has a “negligible
and perhaps slightly negative effect [i.e., an increase] on the expected
number of accidents.”155 Third, the authors also subdivided each of
Texas’s 254 counties into several discrete categories based on the
stringency of access controls,156 on the theory that the simple wet versus
dry classification could mask important differences among counties
falling within those broad categories.157 In so doing, the authors again
found that local access controls increased the rate of automobile deaths
in a county.158 The authors hypothesized that “the effect on alcoholrelated accidents of consumers driving a shorter distance more than
offsets the effect of any increase in consumption” attributable to more
relaxed controls.159
In a 2004 study of DUI offenses in Arkansas, Professors Edward
Powers and Janet Wilson sought to better control for differences in the
enforcement of drunk-driving laws across counties. To do so, the
authors calculated the amount of police time actually devoted to
instrument if unobserved determinants of local tourism revenue are also
related to the unobserved factors influencing highway safety”).
153. Id. at 1091.
154. Id. at 1093.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1091 (“Specifically, we observe whether the county allows the sale
of beer and/or wine, whether the county allows the sale of all liquors for
off-premise consumption and whether the county allows all types of
alcohol to be sold for off-premise and on-premise consumption.”).
157. See id. at 1093–95 (explaining that “previous models impose the restriction that law changes from dry to any local access have the same effect on
highway safety. In addition, moving from one wet status such as access
to beer and wine to another such as access to off-premise consumption of
all liquors is assumed to have no effect on the expected number of
accidents. To relax this restriction, we include[d] indicator variables for
the specific type of alcohol access granted within each county.”). The Dull
& Giocapassi study discussed in the text is an exception because it
similarly divided Tennessee counties into five basic legal categories. See
Dull & Giacopassi, supra note 139, at 502–03 (dividing alcohol access laws
into five major categories: dry, semidry, damp, on-premise consumption,
and wet).
158. Baughman et al., supra note 66, at 1095 (noting that “all three local
access laws are associated with an increase in expected accidents”).
159. Id.
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combatting drunk driving rather than the amount spent combatting all
crimes, the control used in earlier studies.160 Employing this refined
control, the authors found “no significant relationship” between county
prohibition and county DUI arrest rates.161 The authors concluded the
following:
Lack of local access to alcohol is more likely to relocate alcohol
use rather than eliminate it. Dry county residents who desire
alcohol must often travel many miles to the nearest legal point of
sale. In Arkansas—a thinly populated state deficient in public
transportation—this almost always means driving to obtain a
drink.162

The studies above suggest that wet jurisdictions may be
undermining the efforts of dry counties to curb consumption of alcohol
and one of its most serious harms. But other studies suggest that dry
counties might actually be displacing drunk-driving harms onto wet
counties. To assess whether alcohol tourism poses this problem,
Professor Sarah Lynn Schulte Gary and her colleagues analyzed details
of more than 39,000 alcohol-related automobile crashes in Kentucky,
including the location of crashes and the county of residence of
drivers.163 The authors found that wet and dry counties had
significantly similar, though not identical, rates of alcohol-fueled
crashes.164 The authors speculated that “[p]eople from dry counties may
be purchasing alcohol in a wet county and drinking at home or with
neighbors and friends.”165 Even more interestingly, however, the authors
found that compared to wet county residents, dry county residents are

160. Powers & Wilson, supra note 85, at 322. The authors note that total
police budgets do not necessarily reflect the effort expended policing
drunk driving. Id. (“Jurisdictions that possess high rates of crime in other
categories may be forced to direct resources away from traffic patrol as
the focus is shifted to other crimes perceived as more important.”). It is
thus possible that controlling only for total police budgets will fail to
accurately account for the impact that police sobriety checkpoints and
similar measures have on drunk driving offenses. To address this concern,
Powers & Wilson control for both the “proportionate number of sworn
officers and the non-DUI arrest rate per officer.” Id. at 331.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 332.
163. Sarah Lynn Schulte Gary et al., Consideration of Driver Home County
Prohibition and Alcohol-Related Vehicle Crashes, 35 Accident Analysis
and Prevention 641 (2003).
164. See id. at 645 (6.3% in wet versus 5.8% in dry).
165. Id.
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1.5 times more likely to be the involved in an alcohol-related crash.166
Given the slightly lower rates of DUI offenses occurring in dry counties,
it appears that dry county residents are consuming alcohol in wet
counties and are causing accidents there—indeed, dry county residents
committed nearly one-fourth (24.5%) of their DUI offenses in wet
counties.167 The authors concluded that “county-level prohibition is not
necessarily effective in improving highway safety. In fact it may be
counterproductive in that individuals are driving farther under the
influence of alcohol, thus, increasing their exposure to crashes.”168
In similar fashion, studies have also found that local prohibitions
on alcohol sales produce little if any impact on the total incidence of
drunk driving statewide. In one study, Professor Frank Chaloupka and
his coauthors found that the percentage of a state’s population living
in a dry county had little or no impact on total driving deaths in the
state.169 The authors concluded that “local limits on the sale of alcoholic
beverages have little effect on drunk driving,” and they speculated that
the lack of impact “may be due to the fact that alcohol could be
purchased easily in nearby counties.”170 Similarly, the Meier and
Johnson study discussed earlier found that local alcohol prohibitions
had no impact on statewide nighttime traffic fatalities,171 though it is
worth noting that state-imposed alcohol sales restrictions did reduce
fatalities.172 Even more stunningly, Professor Christopher Ruhm has
found that automobile fatalities are “positively and significantly related
to . . . the percentage of the population living in dry counties in most

166. Id. (finding that .29% of dry county residents but only .19% of wet county
residents were involved in alcohol-related crashes).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 648.
169. See Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Alcohol-Control Policies and MotorVehicle Fatalities, 22 J. Legal Stud. 161, 183 (1993) (“The variable
measuring the percentage of state populations in dry counties is negative
and significant only in a few specifications.”).
170. Id. at 183. See also Colón, supra note 108, at 104 (finding the rate of car
fatalities significantly higher in states with county level prohibitions than
in states without and hypothesizing that county prohibitions might
simply force drinkers to drive farther to obtain alcohol).
171. A very high percentage of nighttime automobile fatalities are caused by
drunk drivers. See Meier & Johnson, supra note 123, at 422 (“A common,
accepted measure of drunk driving is nighttime fatalities because a high
proportion are alcohol related.”).
172. See id. at 423 (finding that “sales regulation, treatment capacity, dry
population, and tax rates [all] have a negative relationship with nighttime
traffic fatalities”).
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specifications”173—i.e., banning alcohol locally may actually increase the
rate of DUI, because it forces local drinkers to drive farther for a drink.
Like Meier and Johnson, however, Ruhm found that certain stateimposed measures, including minimum drinking ages and beer taxes,
were more successful at reducing automobile fatalities.174
Further evidence that dry counties may be foisting some of the
harms of their own alcohol use onto wet counties comes from county
decisions on legal status. In their fascinating study of the determinants
of the local option, Professors Koleman Strumpf and Felix OberholzerGee analyzed factors influencing the alcohol policy choices of 3,100
counties in the contiguous forty-eight states across a thirty-six-year
period (1934–70).175 The authors found that several variables correlated
with county decisions to restrict sales of liquor, including religious
affiliations (as discussed above).176 More interestingly for present
purposes, the authors found evidence of a strategic interaction among
county policy choices. In other words, it appears that a county’s
decision whether to allow or prohibit alcohol sales is influenced by what
its neighbors have decided.177 The authors suggested that “being
surrounded by wet neighbors lowers the cost of being wet, possibly
because it decreases the number of drunk drivers from neighboring
districts.”178
To be sure, local governments are not completely helpless and there
are undoubtedly some things they could do to reduce alcohol
consumption and its related harms. In a study of three local
communities, for example, Harold Holder and his coauthors found that
adopting a broad array of measures, including limits on access, police
sobriety checkpoints, community mobilization, and training of alcohol
vendors, reduced the incidence of alcohol-related automobile injuries
and other harms in the community.179 But for reasons explained above,

173. Christopher J. Ruhm, Alcohol Policies and Highway Vehicle Fatalities,
15 J. Health Econ. 435, 443 n.16 (1996).
174. Id. at 451 (“[L]egal drinking ages are strongly negatively related to the
fatalities of 18 to 20 year olds and . . . . higher beer taxes appear to reduce
vehicle deaths . . . .”).
175. Strumpf & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 65, at 18.
176. Id. at 22–24 (reporting results of empirical models).
177. See id. at 24 (concluding that “local liquor policies are strategic
compliments”).
178. Id.; cf. Eugenia F. Toma, State Liquor Licensing, Implicit Contracting,
and Dry/Wet Counties, 26 Econ. Inq. 507, 516 (1988) (hypothesizing,
but not finding, a strategic interaction among county alcohol policies in
Kentucky).
179. See Harold D. Holder et al., Effect of Community-Based Interventions on
High-Risk Drinking and Alcohol-Related Injuries, 284 JAMA 2341 (2000)
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this is probably not the first choice of many dry communities.180
Sobriety checkpoints, for example, could be an expensive alternative
compared to broadening access controls.181
***
The experience with alcohol localism provides a sobering lesson. It
appears that counties have encountered many of the problems that I
predicted could plague local marijuana controls. Wet counties have
probably undermined the controls imposed by dry counties, or dry
counties have displaced their harms onto wet counties, or both. If
alcohol localism has failed to meet expectations, why would we expect
marijuana localism to fare any better?

IV. Recommendations
Building upon the foregoing assessment of marijuana localism, this
Part proceeds to make some recommendations for the states. First, it
briefly explains why states could reject marijuana localism if they so
choose. Second, it surveys the choices the states have made so far
concerning marijuana localism. Third, it recommends that states
severely limit the role their local governments play in the marijuana
policy domain.
A.

What States Could Do

It is up to the states to decide whether or not to allow local
governments to regulate marijuana sales. In other words, states do not
necessarily have to tolerate local resistance to decisions made by
statewide majorities. The states can prevent local governments from
exercising authority over marijuana sales in two basic ways.
First, states can withhold regulatory authority from local
governments. Local governments are creatures of the state and derive
all of their regulatory authority from the state.182 In other words, the

(discussing the effects of community action on alcohol consumption and
alcohol-related accidents).
180. See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the practical difficulties in preventing marijuana smuggling.
181. See Kenkel, supra note 137, at 909 (discussing relative costs of alternative
policies to combat drunk driving).
182. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1990) (“The local government is a creature
of the state. It exists only by an act of the state, and the state, as creator,
has plenary power to alter, expand, contract or abolish at will any or all
local units. The local government is a delegate of the state, possessing
only those powers the state has chosen to confer upon it.”).
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states decide what powers local governments shall exercise.183 It follows
that the states could withhold the power to regulate marijuana from
local governments. Without the grant of authority from the state, local
governments would be powerless to regulate the drug.
This is a distinguishing feature of localism and one of the primary
ways it differs from federalism. Unlike localities, the states are not
creatures of the national government, and they do not require the
national government’s blessing to pass legislation. The states are
presumed to have authority to regulate for the health, safety, and
morals of the population, with the exception of a few narrow instances
under which the Constitution deprives them of authority.184 The states
are, of course, entitled to limit their powers via their own constitutions;
but the important point here is that the national Constitution does not
impose such constraints, at least in ways that are relevant here.
Now, to be sure, it is easier to withhold authority in some states
than in others. In Dillon’s Rule states, local governments wield only
those powers that are “indispensable to the purposes of their incorporation as well as any others expressly bestowed upon them by the
state.”185 Local governments in Dillon’s Rule states would need an
express grant of authority from the state to regulate (ban, legalize, etc.)
marijuana. If the state’s marijuana law was silent on the issue of local
power, local governments presumably would lack authority to regulate
the drug.
In Home Rule states, by contrast, local governments are presumed
to wield “any power the state possessed, unless the state legislature had
exclusively reserved power over a particular subject matter to the
state.”186 In California, for example, the state constitution expressly
provides that “A county or city may make and enforce within its limits
all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in
conflict with general laws.”187 While a state may still withhold power
from local governments, it must do so affirmatively—the courts will not
presume the absence of power from silence, as they do in Dillon’s Rule
states.

183. Id. at 7–8 (noting that “[t]he local government is an agent of the state,
exercising limited powers at the local level on behalf of the state”).
184. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No state shall enter into any treaty,
alliance, or confederation . . . .”).
185. Diller, supra note 31, at 1122–23 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 1125. As Diller notes, the majority of states have some form of
Home Rule. Id. at 1126–27. See also Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENVER
U. L. REV. 1337, 1364–71 (2009) (discussing variation in home rule across
states).
187. Calif. Const. Art. XI § 7.
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Second, states can also preempt local legislation.188 That is, even if
a local government has express or implied authority to regulate marijuana, the state may still veto any local regulations adopted pursuant
to this authority. Intrastate preemption follows the same basic rules as
federal-state preemption.189 Local law is preempted when it conflicts
with state law, with or without any express statement of the
legislature’s preemptive intentions.190
Importantly, the states have not encountered the same preemption
barrier in enacting their most recent marijuana reforms. To the extent
states have merely legalized marijuana—i.e., removed state prohibitions
on marijuana—they have not done anything that Congress could
preempt.191 And to the extent the states have gone beyond merely
legalizing marijuana, they have done little that Congress would actually
want to preempt.192
Local governments would not fare so well against intra-state
preemption claims. Local bans on marijuana sales are clearly
preemptable, and private actors subject to those bans have every
incentive to challenge the assertion of local authority. Local legalization
of marijuana could prove more durable against an intra-state
preemption challenge. But it is not clear there is any state law analog
to the federal anticommandeering rule that would protect local
communities from being forced to criminalize sales of marijuana.193 In
other words, states might command local governments to ban
marijuana, even though Congress could not command states to do the
same. In any event, local legalization might not have much practical
effect in the shadow of a statewide ban on marijuana. State law
enforcement, for example, might have the resources needed to shut
down locally regulated marijuana shops. The federal government, by
contrast, has lacked the resources needed to clamp down on state188. See Diller, supra note 31, at 1140–42 (discussing intrastate preemption).
189. See id. at 1140 (“Despite some superficial distinctions, most states’
preemption analyses are similar in form to the federal model.”).
190. See id. at 1140–53 (discussing the rules of implied conflict preemption in
the states).
191. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1445–50
(arguing that Congress cannot stop states from merely legalizing
marijuana under state law).
192. See Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, supra note
17, at 18 (explaining that Congress would not want to preempt state
regulations that restrict the marijuana market—including state marijuana
taxes, licenses, and similar measures—because those measures actually
help to curb the marijuana market).
193. Cf. Kevin Miller, Bill to Ban Local Votes on Legalizing Marijuana Draws
Fire at Hearing, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 2, 2015 (discussing state
legislative proposal that would bar local governments from voting on
marijuana legalization proposals).
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regulated shops,194 giving the states de-facto if not de-jure control
over them.
In sum, marijuana localism is on precarious legal footing. States
have the power to determine the precise role, if any, local governments
will play in the marijuana policy domain. To be sure, this choice may
be more or less constrained, depending on the rules of state
constitutional law, but it is one the states are clearly empowered
to make.
B.

What States Have Done

Twenty-three states have legalized marijuana for some purposes
under state law. As of the November 2014 election, at least twenty-one
of those states have also legalized some form of retail distribution of
marijuana.195 But they have split regarding whether to allow local
communities to ban retail distribution.
Seven states have authorized local governments to ban retail
marijuana shops that are otherwise legal under state law.196 Five of
these states have done so expressly via statute or ballot initiative.197
For example, Amendment 64 specifies that “[a] locality may prohibit
the operation of marijuana cultivation facilities, marijuana product
manufacturing facilities, marijuana testing facilities, or retail marijuana
stores through the enactment of an ordinance or through an initiated
or referred measure.”198 In the two other states, state laws failed to
address the localism question, but key state authorities have found local
bans to be consistent with state law. In California, the state supreme
court upheld a local ban on medical marijuana dispensaries against a
194. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1463–69
(highlighting the federal government’s limited capacity to enforce its
marijuana ban).
195. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Hawaii and Michigan
permit certain individuals to grow marijuana for their own medical
purposes, but they do not formally permit retail distribution of the drug.
See Robert A. Mikos, Expert Report in Allard v. Her Majesty the Queen
in Right of Canada (Oct. 2014) (surveying state laws governing
distribution of marijuana as of fall 2014). Alaska voted to legalize the
retail distribution of marijuana in November 2014. See Alaska Ballot
Meas. 2, (2014).
196. The states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Vermont, and Washington.
197. See Alaska Ballot Meas. 2, (2014); Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(f),
amended by Use and Regulation of Marijuana Amend. 64 (2012); S.B.
423, 62nd Leg. (Mont. 2011); S.B. 374, 77th Sess. (Nev. 2013); S.B. 17,
2011–12 Sess. (Vt. 2011).
198. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(f).
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preemption challenge brought under the state’s long-standing medical
marijuana law.199 It reasoned that state law “merely exempts” medical
marijuana dispensaries from “prohibitions that would otherwise apply
under state law. . . . [It] does not thereby mandate that local
governments authorize, allow, or accommodate the existence of such
facilities.”200 Similarly, in Washington, the state attorney general
opined that local governments could ban retail marijuana shops,
reasoning that the state’s law legalizing and regulating marijuana
distribution did not “amount to entitling one to engage in such
businesses regardless of local law.”201
Four states have denied local governments the power to ban retail
marijuana shops.202 Three states have rejected the local option expressly
via statute or ballot initiative.203 In Oregon, for example, Measure 91
expressly provides that the essential portions of the measure are
“designed to operate uniformly throughout the state, shall be
paramount and superior to and shall fully replace and supersede any
and all municipal charter enactments or local ordinances inconsistent
with it. Such charters and ordinances hereby are repealed.”204
Massachusetts’ medical marijuana law is silent regarding local
authority over marijuana dispensaries. However, the state’s attorney
general has invoked the law to block local communities from banning
medical marijuana dispensaries outright.205 She noted that state law is

199. See generally City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and
Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d 494 (Cal. 2013) (upholding a local ban on
medical marijuana dispensaries).
200. Id. at 510.
201. See Att’y Gen. of Wash., AGO 2014 No. 2, Whether Statewide
Initiative Establishing Sys. for Licensing Marijuana Producers,
Processors, and Retailers Preempts Local Ordinances (2014)
(concluding that “[l]ocal governments have broad authority to regulate
within their jurisdictions, and nothing in 1-502 limits that authority with
respect to licensed marijuana businesses”).
202. The states include Arizona, Delaware, Massachusetts, and Oregon.
203. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2806.01 (LexisNexis 2010); Del. Code Ann. tit.
16, §§ 4901A, 4917A (2014); Or. Ballot Meas. 91, § 58 (2014).
204. Or. Ballot Meas. 91, § 58 (2014). Just prior to the passage of Measure 91,
a lower state court had ruled that local governments could ban medical
marijuana dispensaries. Noelle Crombie, Medical Marijuana in Oregon:
Court Rules that Local Governments May Ban Dispensaries, The
Oregonian, Oct. 17, 2014.
205. Letter from Martha Coakley, Att’y Gen. Mass., to Mary K. Galvin, Town
Clerk, Town of Wakefield (Mar. 13, 2013) available at http://
www.mass.gov/ago/docs/municipal/wakefield-6601.pdf [hereinafter Coakley Letter] (concluding that “a town meeting vote to completely ban
medical marijuana treatment centers . . . would frustrate the purpose of
[state laws]”). The Massachusetts Attorney General has authority to
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intended to give qualifying patients “reasonable access” to medical
marijuana dispensaries, and to serve that end, it requires dispensaries
to be “reasonably dispersed throughout the Commonwealth.”206 The
attorney general reasoned that “This legislative purpose could not be
served if a municipality could prohibit treatment centers within its
borders, for if one municipality could do so, we see no principled basis
on which every other municipality could not do the same.”207
Notwithstanding their firm rejection of local authority to ban
marijuana shops, all of these states do allow local authorities to enact
some reasonable regulations to govern them.208 For example, Measure
91 permits localities to adopt “reasonable time, place and manner
regulations of the nuisance aspects of establishments that sell
marijuana” but only if “the city or county makes specific findings that
the establishment would cause adverse effects to occur.”209
In the remaining ten states that permit retail distribution of
marijuana, the status of local power to ban marijuana shops remains
unsettled because no statute expressly addresses the issue and no high
court or other high–level state official has yet opined on the question.
C.

What States Should Do

Not surprisingly, I strongly recommend that states limit local
authority over marijuana. In light of the threat posed by marijuana
smuggling and marijuana tourism, it seems reasonable to suppose that
a large portion of a state’s population might be more satisfied living
under imperfect but effective state regulations than under more
agreeable but ineffective local regulations. To be sure, it is impossible
to gauge with certainty localism’s net impact on total satisfaction in a
state. But the fact that local communities do not bear the full costs
and benefits of the marijuana policies they adopt suggests that states
cannot expect those communities to necessarily adopt policies that
enhance the well-being of the entire state. Because the state is the only
forum in which all interested parties have a voice, I suggest the states
disapprove of (i.e., block) a local bylaw when it is inconsistent with state
law. Id. at 5.
206. Id. at 6.
207. Id.
208. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2806.01 (LexisNexis 2010) (“Cities, towns and
counties may enact reasonable zoning regulations that limit the use of
land for registered nonprofit medical marijuana dispensaries to specified
areas.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 4901A, 4917A (2014) (preventing
the local government from prohibiting a “registered compassion center”);
Coakley Letter, supra note 205, at 1 (conceding that “municipalities are
not prohibited from adopting zoning bylaws to regulate medical
marijuana treatment centers, so long as such zoning by-laws do not
conflict with the [Massachusetts Medical Marijuana] Act”); Or. Ballot
Meas. 91, § 59(1) (2014).
209. Or. Ballot Meas. 91, § 59(1) (2014).
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should reserve to themselves exclusive authority to decide key policy
questions, like whether retail sales of marijuana are to be permitted and
what tax shall be imposed upon them, and should not enable local
communities to override state decisions.
Local communities could still play a role in shaping marijuana
policy. It would make sense for state regulators to listen to the concerns
expressed by local officials. States could even allow local officials to
formulate their own policy on matters that are less likely to impact
people outside the community, like the location of and signage used by
marijuana stores. This obviously will not give local communities
everything they want, but it will limit the danger local communities
pose to each other.
Importantly, no matter what the states decide, they should address
the localism issue early and clearly in legislation. Addressing localism
this way should help reduce resort to costly and protracted litigation
to settle the boundaries of local power. And addressing localism via
statute could also result in a better allocation of power. There is no
guarantee that the rule adopted by a court applying generic preemption
principles will be the socially optimal one for marijuana.

Conclusion
In the battle for control of marijuana policy, the states have scored
an impressive and surprising victory.210 Their reforms have not only
survived but thrived in the shadow of a strict federal marijuana
prohibition. In the process, the states have exposed the de jure and de
facto limits to federal supremacy.
But the states now face a very different challenge—managing the
conflict within. Local governments are now clamoring for the right to
opt out of state reforms, employing the same normative arguments the
states used to defend their resistance to federal authority. Should the
states accede to local control?
This Article has examined the economic case for marijuana
localism. While communities clearly disagree about marijuana policy,
it is not clear that localism would enhance satisfaction. Disparities in
local marijuana policies could trigger rampant marijuana smuggling
and marijuana tourism, leaving many residents dissatisfied with local
control. For these reasons, and heeding the sobering lessons of local
alcohol control, the Article tentatively concludes that states should
enjoy their apparent victory over the federal government, embrace
marijuana federalism, and keep marijuana localism at bay.

210. See Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy, supra note 10, at 1425 (“The
states have not only kept the patient breathing, so to speak, in
anticipation of a day when federal policy might change; they have, for all
practical purposes, already made medical marijuana de facto legal within
their jurisdictions.”).
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